Defending Australia

Edited by Justin Healey

ISSUES IN SOCIETY
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**Exploring issues – worksheets and activities**  
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Defending Australia is Volume 416 in the 'Issues in Society' series of educational resource books. The aim of this series is to offer current, diverse information about important issues in our world, from an Australian perspective.

KEY ISSUES IN THIS TOPIC
Australia is in the process of updating and strengthening its defence capabilities against potential armed attacks. The latest government white paper has outlined a massive increase in military spending and confirmed the direction of Australia’s defence policy and strategy.

This book examines the operational priorities and capabilities of the Australian army, navy and airforce as well as exploring the nation’s planned strategic direction. Topics also include Australia’s defence history, current war operations and peacekeeping contributions around the globe, the inclusion of more women in the Australian Defence Force, and the plight of returned veterans.

A key focus of the book is the nation’s increased defence budget and upgrading of capabilities such as new submarines, frigates and fighter aircraft, at a time when Australia must adapt to a complex strategic and diplomatic environment which is dominated by long-term major ally the United States and the emerging military might of China in the Asia-Pacific region. When should Australians take up arms, and what are the costs and consequences of war? Are Australia’s strategic defence policies, capabilities and alliances enough to protect the nation from attack?

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Titles in the ‘Issues in Society’ series are individual resource books which provide an overview on a specific subject comprised of facts and opinions.

The information in this resource book is not from any single author, publication or organisation. The unique value of the ‘Issues in Society’ series lies in its diversity of content and perspectives.

The content comes from a wide variety of sources and includes:

- Newspaper reports and opinion pieces
- Website fact sheets
- Magazine and journal articles
- Statistics and surveys
- Government reports
- Literature from special interest groups

CRITICAL EVALUATION
As the information reproduced in this book is from a number of different sources, readers should always be aware of the origin of the text and whether or not the source is likely to be expressing a particular bias or agenda.

It is hoped that, as you read about the many aspects of the issues explored in this book, you will critically evaluate the information presented. In some cases, it is important that you decide whether you are being presented with facts or opinions. Does the writer give a biased or an unbiased report? If an opinion is being expressed, do you agree with the writer?

EXPLORING ISSUES
The ‘Exploring issues’ section at the back of this book features a range of ready-to-use worksheets relating to the articles and issues raised in this book. The activities and exercises in these worksheets are suitable for use by students at middle secondary school level and beyond.

FURTHER RESEARCH
This title offers a useful starting point for those who need convenient access to information about the issues involved. However, it is only a starting point. The ‘Web links’ section at the back of this book contains a list of useful websites which you can access for more reading on the topic.
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE FORCE

OVERVIEW

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is the military organisation responsible for the defence of Australia. It consists of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Australian Army, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and a number of ‘tri-service’ units. The ADF has a strength of just over 80,000 full-time personnel and active reservists, and is supported by the Department of Defence and several other civilian agencies.

During the first decades of the 20th century, the Australian Government established the armed services as separate organisations. Each service had an independent chain of command. In 1976, the government made a strategic change and established the ADF to place the services under a single headquarters. Over time, the degree of integration has increased and tri-service headquarters, logistics and training institutions have supplanted many single-service establishments.

The ADF is technologically sophisticated but relatively small. Although the ADF’s 58,061 full-time active-duty personnel and 19,338 active reservists make it the largest military in Oceania, it is still smaller than most Asian militaries. Nonetheless, the ADF is supported by a significant budget by worldwide standards and is able to deploy forces in multiple locations outside Australia.

CURRENT PRIORITIES

The ADF’s current priorities are set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper, which identifies three main areas of focus. The first of these is to defend Australia from direct attack or coercion. The second priority is to contribute to the security of South-East Asia and the South Pacific. The third priority is to contribute to stability across the Indo-Pacific region and a “rules-based global order which supports our interests”. The White Paper states that the government will place equal weight on the three priorities when developing the ADF’s capabilities.

CURRENT OPERATIONS

In September 2015, 2,241 ADF personnel were deployed on operations in Australian territory and overseas.

The ADF currently has several forces deployed to the Middle East. The ADF’s contribution to the military intervention against ISIL makes up the largest overseas commitment with 780 personnel deployed as part of Operation Okra. As of November 2015, six F/A-18A Hornets, one E-7A Wedgetail and one KC-30A
tanker were deployed to strike Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria. Approximately 380 personnel were deployed to Iraq as part of an international effort to provide training and other forms of assistance to the Iraqi military. Deployments in Afghanistan number 250 personnel in Operation Highroad, a non-combat training mission supporting the Afghan National Army. A frigate is also deployed to the Middle East in maritime security operations in and around the Gulf of Aden as part of the Combined Maritime Forces. Australian personnel also form part of peacekeeping missions in Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Sudan. The ADF has a further 400 personnel based in the Middle East to support operations in the region.

Australian military units are also deployed on operations in Australia’s immediate region. As of September 2015, 500 personnel were deployed on Australia’s northern approaches in maritime security operations, forming Operation Resolute. ADF units undertake periodic deployments in the South China Sea and South West Pacific.

FUTURE TRENDS

Australia’s changing security environment will lead to new demands being placed on the Australian Defence Force. Although it is not expected that Australia will face any threat of direct attack from another country, terrorist groups and tensions between nations in East Asia pose threats to Australian security. More broadly, the Australian Government believes that it needs to make a contribution to maintaining the rules-based order globally. There is also a risk that climate change, weak economic growth and social factors could cause instability in South Pacific countries.

Australian demographic trends will put pressure on the ADF in the future. Excluding other factors, the ageing of the Australian population will result in smaller numbers of potential recruits entering the Australian labour market each year. Some predictions are that population ageing will result in slower economic growth and increased government expenditure on pensions and health programs. As a result of these trends, the ageing of Australia’s population may worsen the ADF’s manpower situation and may force the Government to reallocate some of the Defence budget. Relatively few young Australians consider joining the military and the ADF has to compete for recruits against private sector firms which are able to offer higher salaries.

The ADF has developed strategies to respond to Australia’s changing strategic environment. The 2016 Defence White Paper states that “the Government will ensure Australia maintains a regionally superior ADF with the highest levels of military capability and scientific and technological sophistication”. To this end, the government intends to improve the ADF’s combat power and expand the number of military personnel. This will include introducing new technologies and capabilities. The ADF is also seeking to improve its intelligence capabilities and co-operation between the services.

ADF: who we are and what we do

Mission

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is constituted under the Defence Act 1903, its mission is to defend Australia and its national interests. In fulfilling this mission, Defence serves the Government of the day and is accountable to the Commonwealth Parliament which represents the Australian people to efficiently and effectively carry out the Government’s defence policy.

Role

The primary role of Defence is to defend Australia against armed attack.

Australia’s defence policy is founded on the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia, but with a capacity to do more where there are shared interests with partners and allies.

Strategic direction

The Defence White Paper was released on 25 February 2016 together with an Integrated Investment Program and Defence Industry Policy Statement. Defence White Papers are the Government’s most important guidance about Australia’s long-term defence capability. They provide an opportunity for the Government and community to understand the the opportunities and challenges for Australia’s future defence and security needs. The White Paper provides a strategy aligned with capability and resources to deliver a future force that is more capable, agile and potent and ready to respond to future challenges.

Commonwealth of Australia 2016.

The Australian Army is the nation’s military land force, and was first established with Australia’s Federation in 1901.

The Army is one of three components of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), along with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

The Australian Army currently maintains an active force of 43,667 personnel (as at 2014-15 financial year), consisting of 29,366 permanent (regular) and 14,301 active reservists (part-time). Additionally, there are another 12,496 members of the Standby Reserve. The regular Army is targeted to expand to 30,464 (regular) and 15,250 (part-time) personnel by 2015-16.

Command of the Australian Army is by the Chief of Army, under the overall direction of the Chief of Defence and the Minister of Defence.

In addition to maintaining the defence of Australia’s territory, the Australian Army has engaged in a number of overseas conflicts and major wars over the years, including: the Second Boer War (1899-1902), First World War (1914-18), the Second World War (1939-45), Korean War (1950-53), Malayan Emergency (1950-60), Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation (1962-66), Vietnam War (1962-73), Afghanistan (2001-2016) and Iraq (1998, 2003-2011).

Since 1947 the Australian Army has been actively involved in a number of peacekeeping operations, mostly under the oversight of the United Nations (UN). Australia’s largest peacekeeping deployment began in 1999 in East Timor; other ongoing operations include peacekeeping on Bougainville, in the Sinai, and in the Solomon Islands. Humanitarian relief after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake in Aceh Province, Indonesia (Operation Sumatra Assist), ended in March 2005.

The Australian Army has seen the most significant involvement in the war in Afghanistan out of the three Australian defence forces, making up the ground combat and training element of Operation Slipper. In 2013 all Australian military forces, including Australian Army elements were drawn down and withdrawn, with 400 Australian military personnel remaining in Afghanistan in training and advisory roles before withdrawing at the end of 2016. Overall, 40 Australians were killed and 261 wounded in the war in Afghanistan.

Compiled by The Spinney Press.
Sources: Lowy Institute (2017), Australian Army.
Wikipedia, Australian Army.
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

- The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is the naval branch of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and was established following the Federation of Australia in 1901.
- The RAN is one of three components of the Australian Defence Force, along with the Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
- The Royal Australian Navy currently maintains 50 vessels (47 commissioned ships, 3 non-commissioned), which range across submarines, frigates, amphibious support ships, tankers, coastal patrol vessels and various types of maritime aircraft.
- The Royal Australian Navy maintains a current active force of approximately 14,000 permanent personnel; the Reserve component consists of approximately 8,000 personnel.
- In addition to maintaining defence of Australia’s territory, the RAN has engaged in a number of overseas conflicts and major wars over the years, including: the First World War (1914-18), the Second World War (1939-45), Korean War (1950-53), Malayan Emergency (1950-60), Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation (1962-66), Vietnam War (1962-73), and more recently in Afghanistan (2001-2016) and Iraq (1998, 2003-2011).
- As an island nation with a long history of strategic trade and diplomatic engagement, Australia maintains diverse trade and diplomatic ties. To reflect this island status, Australia’s foreign policy has always featured a strong naval component to ensure that the RAN performs a key role in the use and projection of Australian military power.
- The Royal Australian Navy is currently engaged in a range of security commitments: naval assets and personnel patrol the Persian Gulf; an international counter-piracy taskforce in the Gulf of Aden; supporting operations for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan; and patrol duty to protect Australian maritime sovereignty in partnership with the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.
- The RAN played an important role in coordinating the rescue effort for the missing Malaysian airliner MH370 (the search was officially suspended in January 2017), highlighting the Australian navy’s growing engagement in regional collaboration and defence diplomacy.
- The capacity of the Royal Australian Navy for transporting the ADF has been notably enhanced over the past decade. The RAN has increased its capabilities and developed its logistical flexibility in order to respond with amphibious operations to peacekeeping deployments such as in East Timor and the Solomon Islands.
- The RAN has recently purchased several transport and replenishment ships, commissioned two Canberra class landing-helicopter dock vessels, and has three Hobart class air-warfare destroyers under construction.
- The Australian government has also undertaken to spend $50 billion to upgrade double its submarine fleet to twelve, to ensure the Royal Australian Navy will enjoy greater reach for unforeseen regional military contingencies.

Compiled by The Spinney Press.
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was established in 1921 as the aviation branch of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

The RAAF is one of three components of the Australian Defence Force, alongside the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

The RAAF provides support across a spectrum of operations such as air superiority, precision strikes, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air mobility and humanitarian support.

The Royal Australian Air Force currently has 14,120 active personnel and 4,273 reserve personnel; as well as 259 aircraft, of which 110 are combat aircraft.

The RAAF is the last of the military services to be established in Australia, however it has quickly developed into a flexible instrument for Australian defence policy.

As a geographically large country with a comparatively small population, Australia has maintained a regional technological edge in air power, fielding a variety of modern aircraft models capable of air mobility, combat, training, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations.

The RAAF has taken part in many of the major conflicts of the 20th century. During the Second World War a number of RAAF squadrons of bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft served initially in Britain, and with the Desert Air Force located in North Africa and the Mediterranean, while the majority were later primarily deployed in the South West Pacific area. Thousands of Australian RAAF crew members also served with other Commonwealth air forces in Europe.

By the end of the Second World War, a total of 216,900 men and women had served in the RAAF, of whom 10,562 were killed in action.

Subsequent to WWII, the RAAF has served in a number of conflicts, including the Berlin Airlift, Korean War, Malayan Emergency, Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation and Vietnam War.

Most recently, the RAAF has participated in operations in East Timor, the Iraq War, the war in Afghanistan, and in the ongoing military intervention against Islamic State.

Compiled by The Spinney Press.
DEFENCE FORCE GLOBAL OPERATIONS

Following is a snapshot compilation of operations currently being conducted domestically and overseas to protect Australia and its national interests.

The Government has deployed Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel to operations overseas and within Australia to protect the nation and its interests.

ADF personnel across all three forces (army, navy, air force) are actively protecting Australia's borders and offshore maritime interests. In September 2015, 2,241 ADF personnel were currently deployed on operations in Australian territory and overseas.

The ADF currently has several forces deployed to the Middle East. The ADF’s contribution to the military intervention against ISIL makes up the largest overseas commitment with 780 personnel deployed as part of Operation Okra.

As of November 2015, six F/A-18A Hornets, one E-7A Wedgetail and one KC-30A tanker were deployed to strike Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria. Approximately 380 personnel were deployed to Iraq as part of an international effort to provide training and other forms of assistance to the Iraqi military. Deployments in Afghanistan number 250 personnel in Operation Highroad, a non-combat training mission supporting the Afghan National Army. A frigate is also deployed to the Middle East in maritime security operations in and around the Gulf of Aden as part of the Combined Maritime Forces. Australian personnel also form part of peacekeeping missions in Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Sudan. The ADF has a further 400 personnel based in the Middle East to support operations in the region.

Australian military units are also deployed on operations in Australia’s immediate region. As of September 2015, 500 personnel were deployed on Australia’s northern approaches in maritime security operations, forming Operation Resolute. ADF units undertake periodic deployments in the South China Sea and South West Pacific.

Following is a list of current Australian Defence Force operations. For up-to-date information on operations, visit the Department of Defence website at: www.defence.gov.au/operations

IRAQ

Operation Okra
- The Australian Defence Force’s contribution to the international effort to combat the terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria by Islamic State (also known as Daesh, ISIL, ISIS).
- Coordinated with a coalition of international partners, including the Iraqi government and Gulf nations.
- About 780 ADF personnel have deployed to the Middle East in support of Operation Okra. These personnel make up the Air Task Group (ATG), the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) and Task Group Taji (TG Taji).

AFGHANISTAN

Operation Highroad
- After years of conflict and instability, Australia remains committed to Afghanistan being stable and secure.
- The Australian Defence Force’s commitment to Afghanistan continues with personnel serving with the ADF’s Task Group Afghanistan, headquartered at Kabul’s international airport.
- The task group comprises approximately 45 ADF personnel.

### NUMBERS OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL ON OPERATION

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<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
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<td>500</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<td>ASLAN</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Reviewed annually</td>
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<td>MANITOU</td>
<td>Middle East Region</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAZURKA</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<td>OKRA</td>
<td>Middle East Region and Iraq</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALADIN</td>
<td>Israel/Lebanon</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reviewed annually</td>
</tr>
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<td>PALATE II</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reviewed annually</td>
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<td>RESOLUTE</td>
<td>Australian Maritime Interests</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<td>HIGHROAD</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<td>SOUTHERN INDIAN OCEAN</td>
<td>Southern Indian Ocean</td>
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Iraq
Operation Okra

Afghanistan
Operation Highroad

Border Protection
Operation Resolute

Southern Indian Ocean
Operation Southern Indian Ocean

Israel/Lebanon
Operation Paladin

Egypt
Operation Mazurka

South Sudan
Operation Aslan

South West Pacific Nations
Operation Render Safe

South West Pacific
Operation Solania

South China Sea/Indian Ocean
Operation Gateway

Middle East Region
Operation Accordion

Middle East Region Maritime
Operation Manitou
personnel tasked with coordinating administration, communications and logistics support for all ADF members deployed to Afghanistan.

- Australia continues to support the NATO-led Resolute Support, a training, advisory, assistance, and counter-terror mission consisting of over 13,000 troops in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which began on January 1, 2015, replacing the previous NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.
- Approximately 250 ADF members from the army, navy, airforce and defence civilians are deployed in Afghanistan as part of Operation Highroad.

**Operation Palate II**
- Palette II is the ADF’s contribution to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) which promotes reconciliation and rapprochement, and manages humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction in Afghanistan.
- Two Australian Army Officers serve as military advisers within the UNAMA Military Adviser Unit. Their duties include maintaining contact and liaison with all military forces throughout Afghanistan on behalf of UNAMA. The ADF officers are based in Kabul and Kandahar.

**BORDER PROTECTION**

**Operation Resolute**
- Operation Resolute is the ADF’s contribution to the Australian Government’s effort to protect Australia’s borders and offshore maritime interests.
- The Operation Resolute Area of Operations covers approximately 10 per cent of the world’s surface and includes Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (AEEZ) which extends up to 200 nautical miles from the Australian mainland and offshore territories. Christmas, Cocos Keeling, Heard, McDonald, Macquarie, Norfolk and Lord Howe Islands also fall within the Operation Resolute boundaries.
- The ADF protects Australia’s maritime domain from security threats. These threats include: illegal maritime arrivals; maritime terrorism; piracy, robbery and violence at sea; compromise to biosecurity; illegal activity in protected areas; illegal exploitation of natural resources (e.g. illegal fishing); marine pollution; and prohibited imports and exports.
- At any one time, up to 800 ADF personnel at sea, in the air and on the land, are working to protect Australia’s borders and offshore maritime interests. They work alongside personnel from Australian Customs and Border Protection Service and other agencies.

**ISRAEL/LEBANON**

**Operation Paladin**
- The ADF is committed to Operation Paladin, contributing to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic.
- The UNTSO was established in 1948 to supervise the truce agreed at the conclusion of the first Arab/
Since 1956, members of the Australian contingent have been employed in a variety of roles. Twelve ADF personnel are currently deployed on this operation.

**EGYPT**

**Operation Mazurka**

- Twenty-five ADF members working under Operation Mazurka are assisting the 12-nation Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, Egypt. The MFO is a non-UN organisation established in 1981 to oversee long-standing peace agreements in the region.
- ADF members assist in the peace process by monitoring the border, preparing daily operational briefings and supporting the headquarters.

**SOUTH SUDAN**

**Operation Aslan**

- Operation Aslan is the name for the deployment of Australian Defence Force personnel to the United Nations’ Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The ADF has contributed personnel to UNMISS since September 2011 and the ADF’s commitment assists the UN to protect the people of the Republic of South Sudan through the monitoring of human rights and the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- The ADF contingent occupy non-combat roles, comprising up to 25 personnel from Air Force, Navy and Army who are deployed for between 6-9 months.

**SOUTH WEST PACIFIC**

**Operation Render Safe**

- This is the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) annual series of operations that aims to safely dispose of World War II-vintage Explosive Remnants of War from South Pacific island nations.
- The 2014 operation was the largest mission in the series yet undertaken, involving some 500 personnel in the district of Torokina on the west coast of Bougainville.
- 16 tonnes of ordnance was disposed of, which involved the clearing of 109 sites of 2,293 ammunition items.
- The ADF-led mission involved Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams from Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada and Solomon Islands.

**SOUTH CHINA SEA/INDIAN OCEAN**

**Operation Gateway**

- Gateway entails the ADF provision of maritime surveillance patrols in the North Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Operation Gateway is an enduring contribution by Australia to the preservation of regional security and stability in South-East Asia.
- The Australian Defence Force provides maritime surveillance patrols in the North Indian Ocean and South China Sea.
- Operation Gateway helps maintain the bilateral Defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia.
- Operation Gateway is also part of the support to Australia’s efforts to counter people smuggling in the region.
- ADF assets are dedicated to Operation Gateway taskings periodically. The number of personnel involved vary on each occurrence.
MIDDLE EAST REGION

Operation Accordion
• The mission of this operation is to support the sustainment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations, enable contingency planning and enhance regional relationships in the Middle East Region (MER).
• Around 400 ADF personnel provide support to Australian operations throughout the region, including Operations Okra, Highroad and Manitou.

Operation Manitou
• Operation Manitou is the current name for the Australian Government’s contribution to support international efforts to promote maritime security, stability and prosperity in the Middle East Region (MER).
• Since 1990, the RAN has conducted strategically important maritime security operations in the Middle East Region.
• Operation Manitou is under command of Joint Task Force 633 (JTF633), which is the Australian National HQ in the Middle East Region. The Royal Australian Navy routinely sends a Major Fleet Unit (MFU) to the MER for assignment to Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).
• Combined Maritime Forces is composed of thirty-one nations and has three principle task forces dealing with counter-terrorism and maritime security operations; counter-piracy operations; and Arabian Gulf maritime security operations.
• The RAN MFU currently deployed is the newly upgraded HMAS Perth (III) with around 190 officers and sailors on board. This is the 63rd rotation of a Royal Australian Navy vessel to the MER since 1990.

Compiled by The Spinney Press.

Sources: Department of Defence, Global Operations; Wikipedia, Australian Defence Force.
Australian military history overview

Military history timeline reproduced courtesy of the Department of Defence

Colonial period, 1788-1901
British settlement of Australia began as a penal colony governed by a captain of the Royal Navy. Until the 1850s, when local forces began to be recruited, British regular troops garrisoned the colonies with little local assistance.

Sudan, March-June 1885
In the early 1880s the British-backed Egyptian regime in the Sudan was threatened by an indigenous rebellion under the leadership of Muhammed Ahmed, known to his followers as the Mahdi. In 1883 the Egyptian government, with British acquiescence, sent an army south to crush the revolt. Instead of destroying the Mahdi’s forces, the Egyptians were soundly defeated, leaving their government with the problem of extricating the survivors.

South African War (Boer War), 1899-1902
From soon after its acquisition by Britain during the Napoleonic wars, the southern tip of Africa had been shared between British colonies and independent republics of Dutch-Afrikaner settlers, known as Boers.

China (Boxer Rebellion), 1900-01
Throughout 1899 the I-ho-ch’uan and other militant societies combined in a campaign against westerners and westernised Chinese. Missionaries and other civilians were killed, women were raped, and European property was destroyed. By March 1900 the uprising spread beyond the secret societies and western powers decided to intervene, partly to protect their nationals but mainly to counter the threat to their territorial and trade ambitions.

First World War, 1914-18
The First World War began when Britain and Germany went to war in August 1914, and Prime Minister Andrew Fisher’s government pledged full support for Britain. The outbreak of war was greeted in Australia, as in many other places, with great enthusiasm.

Second World War, 1939-45
On 3 September 1939 Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies announced the beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Second World War on every national and commercial radio station in Australia.

Almost a million Australians, both men and women, served in the Second World War. They fought in campaigns against Germany and Italy in Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa, as well as against Japan in South-East Asia and other parts of the Pacific. The Australian mainland came under direct attack for the first time, as Japanese aircraft bombed towns in north-west Australia and Japanese midget submarines attacked Sydney harbour.

Occupation of Japan, 1946-51
Participation in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) marked the first time that Australians were involved in the military occupation of a sovereign nation which it had defeated in war. BCOF participation in the Allied occupation force was announced on 31 January 1946, though planning and negotiations had been in progress since the end of the war. The main body of Australian troops arrived in Japan on 21 February.

Korean War, 1950-53
Only five years after the end of the Second World War, Australia became involved in

Australian soldier carrying a wounded comrade during the Dardanelles Campaign, World War I, 1915. Source: Shutterstock.
the Korean War. Personnel from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and the Australian Regular Army (ARA) were committed soon after the war began and would serve for the next three years in the defence of South Korea.

Malayan Emergency, 1950-60
The Malayan Emergency was declared on 18 June 1948, after three estate managers were murdered in Perak, northern Malaya. The men were murdered by guerrillas of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), an outgrowth of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement which had emerged during the Second World War. Despite never having had more than a few thousand members, the MCP was able to draw on the support of many disaffected Malayan Chinese, who were upset that British promises of an easier path to full Malayan citizenship had not been fulfilled. The harsh post-war economic and social conditions also contributed to the rise of anti-government activity.

Indonesian Confrontation, 1963-66
Between 1962 and 1966 Indonesia and Malaysia fought a small, undeclared war which came to involve troops from Australia, New Zealand and Britain. The conflict resulted from a belief by Indonesia’s President Sukarno that the creation of the Federation of Malaysia, which became official in September 1963, represented an attempt by Britain to maintain colonial rule behind the cloak of independence granted to its former colonial possessions in South-East Asia.

Vietnam War, 1962-75
Australia’s military involvement in the Vietnam War was the longest in duration of any war in Australia’s history.

The arrival of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) in South Vietnam during July and August 1962 was the beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Australia’s participation in the war was formally declared at an end when the Governor-General issued a proclamation on 11 January 1973. The only combat troops remaining in Vietnam were a platoon guarding the Australian embassy in Saigon, which was withdrawn in June 1973.

The Australian commitment consisted predominantly of army personnel, but significant numbers of air force and navy personnel and some civilians also took part.

Iraq: the First Gulf War, 1990-91
On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded its rival oil-exporting neighbour Kuwait. The invasion was widely condemned, and four days later the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously approved a trade embargo against Iraq. A blockade of Iraq’s access to the sea followed within weeks, as the United States assembled a large multinational task force in
the Persian Gulf, while another was formed in Saudi Arabia.

**Afghanistan, 2001 – present**

From the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former hegemony of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of new independent states and shifts in the international strategic balance. Fundamentalist religious dogma and the resort to mass terrorism replaced Cold War ideologies as a driving force of conflict in the 21st century.

**Iraq: the Second Gulf War, 2003-09**

On 20 March 2003, a combined force of American, British and Australian troops under US leadership invaded Iraq in what was termed the ‘Second Gulf War’. Their object was to locate and destroy suspected ‘weapons of mass destruction’.

Small but highly effective Australian army, air force and navy elements assisted the operation. Within three weeks coalition forces had seized Baghdad and the corrupt and brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was overthrown. However, no weapons of mass destruction were found.

**Peacekeeping, 1947 – present**

With the end of the Second World War, the UN Security Council took responsibility for the collective defence of member states against aggression. However, with conflicts since 1945 being the result of Cold War tensions and internal civil wars, another more practical way was needed to ease conflict.

This desire to keep the peace led to the concept of employing a minimally armed force to monitor an emerging peace between two parties recently at war, either opposed nations or internal factions. In turn, this has led to more complex peace-enforcement operations, where force has been authorised to prevent further conflict, and also the need for humanitarian support in the face of man-made or natural disasters. The overriding goal for these operations has been the use of impartial, multi-national forces to bring peace, stability, and rebuilding to areas in crisis.

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When Australia goes to war, public trust depends on better oversight

Better accountability is essential over decisions to go to war, argues James Brown

The world is absorbing the implications of the long-awaited release of the Chilcot inquiry into the United Kingdom’s decision to go to war in Iraq. Australia, however, has spent comparatively little time learning lessons from the deployment of thousands of troops to fight overseas in recent years. An official war history has just been commissioned; if past form is any guide, it will be at least a decade before it is completed. In any event, its brief is to recount what took place, not to reflect on whether it was the best course of action for Australia.

**Australia’s path to war**

My new Quarterly Essay, *Firing Line: Australia’s Path to War*, argues Australia needs a National Security Council to guide any decision in the future to go to war.

It is also important to restore public trust in the decision to go to war. For this, better democratic accountability is essential.

This is not just about giving parliament a vote on military deployments; after all, a prime minister will always command the approval of the lower house of parliament. Instead, democratic accountability means developing a system capable of exercising genuine oversight of the national security agencies and departments, particularly Defence.

Currently, that oversight takes place in a few ways: through overly adversarial and hasty questioning at Senate estimates, abridged discussion in the lower house when prime ministers and their cabinets deign to allow discussion of national security or defence issues, and in the committee system.

Here, it is telling to compare Australia’s parliamentary committees for defence and national security with their counterparts in Canada and the UK.

Australia’s oversight of national security is underdone and weak: one joint standing committee covers foreign affairs, defence and trade as a whole. A separate joint committee was established to cover intelligence and domestic security after the Hope royal commission into intelligence in the 1980s.

It is extraordinary that so little infrastructure is dedicated to parsing the issues of war.

*It is also important to restore public trust in the decision to go to war. For this, better democratic accountability is essential.*

The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), on which the government will spend A$22 billion each year, has an entire committee dedicated to its oversight. The national security apparatus, which accounts for more than 100,000 Commonwealth employees and will soon absorb more than $45 billion each year, is entirely under-scrutinised. And it shows.

If one scans the list of issues examined, they pale by contrast with the omissions, which include the strategy underpinning the acquisition of Australia’s submarines, Defence White Papers, military education and defence diplomacy.
The next parliament needs committees dedicated to assessing each of the Australian Defence Force, the Department of Defence, national strategy and foreign affairs. This expanded committee system will require trained staff and political advisers with the necessary experience and judgement to grapple with the world of strategy and the opaque language of war – skills that are currently in short supply.

The problem extends to the military itself. Australia’s military gives priority to tactical rather than strategic excellence, and the ability to do battle in the realm of ideas has been more of a liability than an asset. That is starting to change, but only slowly. Our military colleges are not yet universities for the study of war and our universities still view war as a morally tainted activity.

Furthermore, when so much defence decision-making is based on classified assessments and considerations routinely unavailable to members of the opposition, there is a role for a body that can equip parliamentarians to discuss national security policy.

For these reasons, it might prove necessary to create a parliamentary defence office, which seeks to improve the security debate in the same way as the Parliamentary Budget Office, established in 2012, has in the area of economics.

The need for full parliamentary approval before any substantial military action by the prime minister would inhibit an effective response to a crisis. Successive prime ministers have rightly resisted this. But there is a compelling case for parliament to review whether a military deployment is in the national interest within a period of, say, 90 days.

Here, we have a model in the way the Australian parliament deals with foreign treaties. It is the executive’s role to sign treaties with other countries and, in the past, it was entirely up to the foreign minister to present these treaties to the parliament for domestic legislation. But, in 2005, reforms were introduced that require a new joint committee on treaties to prepare a statement on whether a treaty is in the national interest or not, and table it before the parliament.

A similar system could be applied to the decision to go to war.

This is an edited extract from Quarterly Essay 62 – *Firing Line: Australia’s Path to War* – by James Brown.

James Brown is Adjunct Associate Professor and Research Director, US Studies Centre, University of Sydney.

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**Ten questions to guide decisions on war**

When should Australia go to war? The more we can think through the circumstances in which this question might arise, the less likely we will be to err in our calculations. Here are ten questions to be asked the next time our leaders want to commit Australian forces:

> Are our vital national interests threatened?
> Is there a clear political objective?
> Are our military aims linked to this political objective?
> Can the case be made to the Australian people that this campaign is in their interests, and can their support for the campaign be sustained through casualties and setbacks?
> Do we understand the costs – to the country, to civilian victims, to the enemy and to our veterans?
> What new dangers might this campaign cause?
> What proportion of the Australian Defence Force will it commit?
> What options will close to us if we take this action, and if we don’t?
> Will the opposition remain committed, should it form government?
> How does this end?
Australians have been actively involved in peace operations for nearly 70 years. We have provided military and police personnel to more than 60 United Nations and other multilateral peace and security operations since 1947. We continue this tradition today, with Australians serving in peace and security operations across the globe.

As of 1 April, Australian peacekeepers are serving in the Middle East UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

In our own neighbourhood, Australia has played a leading role in successful regional missions in Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. Australia was instrumental in the diplomacy that led to the Cambodian Peace Settlement. We made a major contribution to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, including sending the first military contingent and providing the commander of the military component of the mission. Australia has also contributed to Commonwealth missions in Zimbabwe and Uganda and continues to deploy personnel to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (Egypt/Israel) and to international stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan.

Addressing the root causes of conflict and building the foundations for peaceful, inclusive societies is critical to preventing and resolving conflict.

Acknowledging the strain on the peacekeeping system, Australia remains closely engaged on implementing the recommendations of the UN Peace Operations Review. In September 2015, we attended the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping and pledged to provide strategic air lift support for UN peacekeeping operations in crisis situations, where and whenever we can. We also pledged to build the capacity of UN troop contributing countries in our region and increase expertise on countering improvised explosive devices.

Australia is the 11th largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget.

Beyond keeping the peace

Addressing the root causes of conflict and building the foundations for peaceful, inclusive societies is critical to preventing and resolving conflict.

Australia provides significant support for UN peacebuilding efforts through the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and through UN country programs which support political, security and development activities focused on contributing to sustainable peace and preventing countries’ relapse into conflict.

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture, which consists of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office was established in 2005 to support countries trapped in the cycle of conflict and relapse.

Australia currently has a multi-year financial commitment to the Fund. We are the 9th largest donor to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which provides fast and flexible funding to meet critical conflict prevention needs in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In our region, the Peacebuilding Fund is currently supporting peacebuilding projects in Myanmar, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and Sri Lanka.

Australia is committed to enhancing the UN’s efforts to sustain peace in conflict-affected contexts. We have closely engaged with the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture to identify ways to improve the UN’s support for fragile and conflict-affected states. Together with Angola, Australia led negotiations on parallel resolutions to the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, which give effect to the review’s findings and advance system-wide reform.

Australia is the 11th largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget.

Australia is a leading advocate for the international implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, which addresses the responsibility of states to protect populations from the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

This principle was agreed to by world leaders in 2005. To strengthen advocacy and implementation of R2P, Australia is a member of the Group of Friends of R2P in both New York and Geneva, a co-facilitator of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, and a partner of the Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes initiative.

The Australian Government provides funding to: the Asia Pacific Centre for R2P; the Global Centre for R2P; and the Joint Office of the UN Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect to advance R2P research and global outreach.

THE ‘RULES-BASED GLOBAL ORDER’, THE UN AND PEACEKEEPING

In the broader context of Australia’s strategic defence interests, peacekeeping is a small but nonetheless important piece of the puzzle, writes Lisa Sharland.

The new Defence White Paper sets out that “Australia’s security and prosperity depend on a stable Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order”. This is the last of three strategic defence interests identified in the paper, with a secure, resilient Australia (including secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication) and a secure nearer region (encompassing maritime South-East Asia and the South Pacific) completing the triad. In order to defend this interest, the White Paper identifies some areas where Australia is and should continue to contribute military capabilities to global coalition operations, with UN peacekeeping operations included among that list in line with approaches in more recent White Papers.

If Australia’s operational engagement in UN peacekeeping doesn’t expand in the coming decade, it’ll be increasingly difficult for the ADF to maintain credibility to deliver on cooperation programs as well as areas of support articulated in the White Paper, such as working with the UN to develop standards or provide training support.

Since the release of the last White Paper in 2013, Australia’s contributions to UN peacekeeping have continued to decline. There are currently just over 30 ADF personnel deployed to UN operations in South Sudan and the Middle East. When you add the nearly dozen AFP personnel also serving on UN peace operations, Australia is ranked 84th out of 123 military and police contributors (as of December 2015). On the issue of contributing further ADF personnel to UN-led operations, the White Paper states (at para 3.31):

“Australia remains one of the most active supporters of the United Nations and Defence will continue to make tailored contributions to United Nations operations in the future where it is in Australia’s interests to do so. In addition to possible contributions to peacekeeping operations, Defence will continue working with the United Nations to build its capacity to lead international efforts to respond to global security challenges. Our efforts will include providing targeted funding and expertise to help the United Nations develop standards and training for its future peacekeeping operations.”

If you’re just looking at numbers, then the claim in this White Paper that Australia is “one of the most active supporters of the United Nations” is readily disputed in contrast to our regional neighbours, with China (9th) and Indonesia (12th) each having close to 3,000 military personnel deployed to UN operations. Of course, numbers aren’t the only reflection of a commitment to UN peacekeeping. Australia can point to other areas of policy and financial support, including its recent term on the UN Security Council. Those numbers also
defend other deployed contributions Australia is making to the ‘rules-based global order’, particularly in the Middle East. However, those avenues of support don’t provide a substitute for operational experience in a UN context.

With most blue helmets currently deployed on the African continent, one of the challenges in assessing Australia’s interests in engaging further in UN peacekeeping is the need for a more nuanced approach to security interests and geographical priorities in Africa. That isn’t explored in any real depth in the current White Paper, even though there is acknowledgement that terrorism and state fragility, particularly in northern and sub-Saharan Africa, are among the strategic drivers shaping the security environment to 2035.

Despite the lack of clarity around ongoing UN peacekeeping engagement, the White Paper identifies peacekeeping as one of several platforms for bilateral and regional Defence cooperation in South-East Asia and the South Pacific. Peacekeeping is referred to in the White Paper as a mechanism for cooperation with China, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. It also notes Australia’s engagement with the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in the area of peacekeeping, and recognises the willingness of regional neighbours Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga to make contributions to UN and other multilateral peacekeeping operations. These statements suggest peacekeeping remains a useful mechanism for Australia’s international defence engagement.

There’s a real risk that any further deterioration in Australia’s engagement in UN peacekeeping will result in a deficit of knowledge within the ADF and Defence about how UN operations function, creating a challenging situation should there be a need for a UN or regional peacekeeping force to support Australia’s second strategic defence interest for a more ‘secure nearer region’ in the future.

Nevertheless, if Australia’s operational engagement in UN peacekeeping doesn’t expand in the coming decade, it’ll be increasingly difficult for the ADF to maintain credibility to deliver on these cooperation programs as well as areas of support articulated in the White Paper, such as working with the UN to develop standards or provide training support.

There’s a real risk that any further deterioration in Australia’s engagement in UN peacekeeping will result in a deficit of knowledge within the ADF and Defence about how UN operations function, creating a challenging situation should there be a need for a UN or regional peacekeeping force to support Australia’s second strategic defence interest for a more ‘secure nearer region’ in the future, particularly given concerns identified about instability in the South Pacific.

In the broader context of Australia’s strategic defence interests, UN peacekeeping is only a small piece of the puzzle and the assessments provided in the White Paper reflect this reality. But it’s worth remembering that Australia’s defence interests have required significant engagement and cooperation with the UN in the past. At a time when the US, UK, European partners and our regional neighbours are increasing their support UN peacekeeping as a means to address the ever-increasing range of security challenges and support the rules-based global order, Australia should be more substantively considering how it might do the same. The White Paper provides a framework to embark on that discussion, but Defence will need to work with other government partners to develop a strategic approach on the way forward.

Lisa Sharland is a senior analyst at ASPI.
Women in the Australian Defence Force: the progress from challenges to choices

When Australia commemorates the Anzac centenary this weekend, tributes will be paid to the thousands of men who died fighting. Since those early days, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has changed considerably, and now women make up 15 per cent of the full-time force.

It was not an easy road to get to this level of participation. Women have only been allowed to serve with men since the 1970s, there have been sex scandals and harassment suits to deal with, and combat roles were off limits until recently – but the culture is changing, and women now have more opportunity than ever.

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) pilot Lieutenant Kate Munari is training to be a flight commander on the MRH-90 helicopter. Lieutenant Munari is one of just five female pilots in the RAN, but said it was not something she ever noticed.

“I’ve just found the people around me respect me as a female but also as a pilot,” she said.

“In the end, it just ends up coming down to your competency and how well you do your job.”

The lieutenant has been a pilot for more than a decade and spent four of those years on loan to the UK Royal Navy’s Commando Helicopter Force, flying its Sea King Mk.4 aircraft. She did three tours to Afghanistan during that time.

“Thanks to the trailblazers”

“It was pretty challenging but very rewarding seeing as you train your whole career to get to that point,” Lieutenant Munari said.

“You get a real sense of satisfaction actually getting out and doing your job and interacting with the troops and the people out there and seeing the difference you can make.”

Women were only integrated with men into the RAN in 1985 and have only been flying since 1999.

Lieutenant Munari said the helicopters she flew in Afghanistan were fired upon at times, but her training prepared her for that.

“You literally spend maybe a nanosecond thinking ‘oh
my God that just happened’ and you get right on with flying,” she said.
“You do the drills you’ve been taught to do, you continue to a safe place, you stop and think about it sometime down the track, but at the time you almost take it as part of the job and keep going.”

Women were only integrated with men into the RAN in 1985 and have only been flying since 1999.
“I think it’s an amazing shift that we’ve had,” Lieutenant Munari said.
“I guess it’s cultural in terms of the wider society, but also definitely in terms of the military as to what we can do nowadays.
“I’m probably grateful to the trailblazers that I had the choice to join up and join as a pilot, because if we hadn’t had some of those trailblazers, we wouldn’t be where we are today.”

First women to serve in Australia “lucky to get in”
Jean Nysen and Gwenda Cornallis, who are now in their 90s, are two of those trailblazers.
With thousands of men serving overseas during World War II, women’s branches of the Navy, Army and Air Force were formed to help with jobs that could be done from Australia.
Mrs Nysen and Mrs Cornallis were recruited to send and receive Morse Code, as part of the Women’s Emergency Signalling Corps within the Women’s RAN Service.
“We didn’t feel like [trailblazers] much at the time, we just felt we were lucky to get in,” Mrs Nysen said.

“[Women in the defence force today] are doing a fantastic job, they really are, the ones that are getting to the top are just as good as any man.”
Mrs Cornallis said she was “absolutely flabbergasted” at the different roles women could do in defence today.
“Pilots, captains of ships, I never thought I’d see the day but it’s happened and it’s wonderful,” she said.
As highly skilled as the women who served during World War II were, their Navy, Army and Air Force organisations were disbanded at the end of the war. They reformed later during the Korean War, but were disbanded once again after that conflict.

By 1992, every defence unit was open to women except combat and that restriction remained until 2013.

According to Dr Kathryn Spurling, a military author and academic from Flinders University, the eventual transition of women integrating into the Navy, Army and Air Force was not an easy one.
“It was a difficult time because you weren’t accepted unless you had done the hard yards which were considered to be the more combat related roles and women hadn’t,” she said.
“So for a couple of generations it was damn difficult, but then came [The Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA)] and that was huge step forward.”
ADFA’s opening in 1986 meant women and men could study and train together for the first time. By 1992, every
Australia announced the removal of the ban on women in combat roles in 2011, included in a suite of measures to change the culture of the Australian Defence Force recommended in the review conducted by Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick.

The Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force Phase 2 report, by Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick, identified a strong capability imperative to improve the treatment of women in the ADF and to enhance their career opportunities.

According to the Women in the ADF report 2013-14:
- 15.4% (8,823) of the ADF permanent workforce are female.
- The breakdown is: Navy 2,637 (19%), Army 3,517 (12%) and Air Force 2,669 (18.7%).
- 266 women are serving on current overseas ADF operations, representing 14.9% of the total deployed force.
- As at 1 April 2015, there were 27 female ADF members in direct combat roles where gender restrictions were recently removed.
- There are 13,707 men and 936 women in various ‘combat and security’ roles such as military police, firefighters, pilots and ground crew.

From 1 January 2013 all Australian Defence Force (ADF) employment categories were opened up to women currently serving in the ADF. The plan ensures women entering these categories are supported and have the same opportunities as their male colleagues.

The categories of Clearance Divers and Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving Officers in the Navy; Infantry, Armoured Corps, some Artillery roles, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadrons and Combat Engineer Squadrons in the Army; and Airfield Defence Guards and Ground Defence Officers in the Air Force were all made open to women over the next five years.

From January 2013, women currently serving as members of the ADF have been entitled to apply for a career in a combat role, provided they meet all the requirements. Direct entry recruitment commenced from January 2016.

Some critics argue that women are still often seen as having inferior physical ability to men and likely to disrupt unit cohesion and effectiveness.

In recent years there have been ongoing concerns over the incidence of sexual abuse and gender-based discrimination in the ADF. In 2014 the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce estimated that around 1,100 currently-serving ADF personnel had abused other members of the military, and recommended that a royal commission be conducted to investigate long-running allegations of sexual abuse and assault of servicewomen at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

In 2013 Chief of Army General David Morrison publicly released a video in which he warned against gender-based discrimination, and stated that he would dismiss members of the Army who engaged in such conduct.

**Compiled by The Spinney Press.**

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defence unit was open to women except combat and that restriction remained until 2013.

**Special Forces last ADF category to open to women**

“Defence has made significant progress in the past 30 years in opening ADF categories and employment opportunities to women,” a Defence spokesperson said.

“In January 2013, all remaining male-only employment categories were opened to serving women with the exception of Special Forces which was opened to serving women in January 2014 [and] all roles will be opened to new recruits by 2016.

“As at 31 March, 2015, there are 13,707 male and 936 female permanent force members in various combat and security roles.

“There are a further 3,011 male and 341 female permanent force members in various aviation roles.

“Roles such as military police, firefighters, maritime warfare officers, pilots and ground crew have been open to women for many years.”

Dr Spurling believed more needed to be done to promote and encourage women in all three forces, but particularly in the Army.

“We’ve moved forward yes definitely, but how much is smoke and mirrors?” she said.

“Until I see women embedded in all these combat categories, I don’t believe we’ve made the ultimate progress yet.”

**Progress should not be “tokenistic”**

Wing Commander Kaarin Kooij from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), has worked in Air Force personnel, capability and recruitment for 25 years.

“I can’t speak for the others, I can only speak for the Air Force, but I think if we do more than what we’re doing it will start to appear tokenistic,” she said.

“I think what we’re doing now is the right balance of encouraging women and making the public realise that we are there, we are a career for them, but we’re not turning it into something that is tokenism.”

Wing Commander Kooij is currently the deputy director of co-ordination and the commanding officer at Headquarters Air Command at RAAF Glenbrook, in...
Sydney's west.

She always followed the administration stream during her career, but said that was entirely her choice.

“I joined in 1990 and just about every Air Force role was available to me then,” Wing Commander Kooij said.

“I could have joined as a pilot, as an engineer, as a technician in 1990, so for me there’s been no change and that’s the way it should have been.”

Wing Commander Kooij said the only Air Force job never to be filled by a woman was that of fighter pilot.

“There’s an enormous amount of pressure for them because you know the media is interested, you know the spotlight is on you, and there is the pressure the individual is going to place on themselves to know they have to graduate, they know they have to pass,” she said.

Wing Commander Kooij said the only Air Force job never to be filled by a woman was that of fighter pilot.

The Navy and Air Force each sit at 18 per cent female participation, but their goals are 25 per cent by 2023. While the Army is currently at 11.9 per cent female participation, with the aim of 15 per cent by 2023.

“It’s not just about achieving fighter pilot status, it’s about all the baggage and all the package that comes with it.”

Scandals, reviews result in female participation targets

In recent years, the ADF has dealt with its own baggage. In 2011, there was the Skype sex scandal that involved a male ADFA cadet broadcasting himself having sex with a female cadet without her knowledge.

Between 2010 and 2013, Defence had to deal with the Jedi Counsel affair involving a group of officers allegedly emailing explicit images of women without their consent.

In the wake of these scandals, the Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick led an independent review of the treatment of women at ADFA, followed by a separate review into improving employment opportunities for women in Defence more broadly, especially in the higher ranks.

In 2012, Defence said it committed to the recommendations made and set some participation targets.

The Navy and Air Force each sit at 18 per cent female participation, but their goals are 25 per cent by 2023.

While the Army is currently at 11.9 per cent female participation, with the aim of 15 per cent by 2023.

Defence “very positive workplace”

Lieutenant Natacha Fasel-Murphy was a beneficiary of the new and improved Defence culture and said it was disappointing that the negative media reports of the past were still brought up.

“Army as a whole is a very positive workplace and those incidents are very isolated and I personally haven’t encountered any of them,” she said.

Lieutenant Fasel-Murphy commands a troop of 30 soldiers, including 28 men, in the Royal Australian Corps of Signals in the Army. The unit provides communications and information systems services in combat and non-combat situations.

“There’s no change in the respect that the soldiers show the male officers and the respect they show the female officers,” Lieutenant Fasel-Murphy said.

“As long as you’re competent and you know what you’re doing, gender is not an issue.

“Since I enlisted in 2010, I’ve always been treated equally and with respect, and another thing I’m quite proud of is that the Australian Army pays equal wages regardless of gender, because I believe there are still a number of industries within Australia that don’t pay genders equally.”

While Lieutenant Fasel-Murphy would like to see more women in the Army, she said she did not believe recruiters should be aiming for a specific number.

“Personally I don’t think quotas are particularly important,” she said.

“I think as long as Army fosters an environment in which both genders can succeed and feel respected then I think we’ve achieved gender diversity.”

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It is normal to experience times of sadness, anxiety and anger following military service. However, if these feelings become overwhelming or linger for more than a week or two, it may be time to ask for help.

The Australian Government scheme ‘At Ease’ offers support, counselling and other resources to help war veterans and Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel living with depression, anxiety and other kinds of mental illness.

**Recognising the signs of mental health issues in veterans and ADF personnel**

Depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress and other disorders are common among the war veteran community. These mental health issues affect everyone in different ways – from sleeplessness and recurring memories to family violence and excessive drinking.

What you are feeling may be related to a mental health issue that you are not aware of.

Common symptoms of mental illness include:

- Poor sleep
- Problems with your sex life
- Problems in your personal relationships
- Loneliness
- Feeling down
- Anxiousness
- Recurring memories
- Grief
- Feelings of anger
- Excessive drug taking
- Excessive drinking
- Violence
- Gambling.

If you think you have, or someone close to you has a mental health issue, it is important to get help before things get worse.

Visit the ‘At Ease’ website for information on the early warning signs of mental illness, and the various mental health treatment plans and support services available across Victoria.

**Common mental health issues in veterans and ADF personnel**

Everyone deals with traumatic or stressful events in different ways. Some people may withdraw from family and friends or become aggressive, while others may have issues with alcohol or drugs. There are, however, a number of mental health issues that commonly affect veterans and ADF personnel.

These include:

- Depression
- Post-traumatic stress disorder
- Social anxiety disorder
- Generalised anxiety disorder
- Panic attacks
- Agoraphobia
- Alcohol use disorders
- Drug use disorders.

**SUMMARY**

- Visit the Australian Defence Force’s ‘At Ease’ website for useful information on mental illness and mental health support services.
- Call the Australian Defence Force (ADF) All Hours Support Line on 1800 628 036 for 24-hour counselling and mental health support. This service is available to all ADF members and their families.
- Call the Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service on 1800 011 046 for confidential and free crisis counselling for war veterans and their families.
- Call the Defence Family Helpline on 1800 624 608 for 24-hour support, information and help in connecting with your local community.
Families of veterans and ADF personnel, and mental illness

Reconnecting with everyday life after experiencing a traumatic event (war, conflict or natural disasters) can be a difficult adjustment. Sometimes it may feel as though a different person has come home. Your partner or child may seem withdrawn or distant. They might have trouble talking about what happened during their service, or they might have problems with anger, alcohol or drugs that they did not have before.

If you need help but do not know where to begin, visit the ‘Families’ section of the ‘At Ease’ website for information on how to start the healing process.

Get help now

If you are in crisis, in danger, or you have seriously harmed yourself, call triple zero (000) for emergency services.

If you do not need immediate assistance but you need help it is a good idea to talk to your friends and family about how you are feeling. They can give you the support you need while you work through the issues you are dealing with. If you are not comfortable talking to those people that are close to you, visit your local doctor or health care professional. They will be able to provide referrals and direct you to more support if you need it.

The Australian Defence Force has a number of telephone support services available to all personnel and veterans and their families. These services allow you to speak to counsellors experienced in issues relating to military service.

Services include:

- **Australian Defence Force (ADF) All Hours Support Line** – call 1800 628 036 for 24-hour counselling and support. This service is available to all ADF members and their families.

- **Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service (VVCS)** – call 1800 011 046 for 24-hour Australia-wide counselling and support. This service is available to all veterans and their families.

- **The Defence Family Helpline** – call 1800 624 608 for 24-hour support, information and help in connecting with your local community.

- **Lifeline** – call 13 11 14 for free, 24-hour Australia-wide crisis support and suicide prevention services.

WHERE TO GET HELP

- Your doctor
- Your counsellor
- Australian Defence Force (ADF) All Hours Support Line, call 1800 628 036
- Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service, call 1800 011 046.

**INCIDENCE OF SUICIDE AMONG SERVING AND EX-SERVING AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL**

The Department of Veterans’ Affairs commissioned the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare to calculate, for the first time, accurate numbers and rates of suicide deaths among people who have transitioned from full-time service in the ADF.

In 2001-2014, there were 292 certified suicide deaths among people who have at least 1 day of ADF service since 2001. Of these:

- 84 occurred in the serving full-time population
- 66 occurred in the reserve population
- 142 occurred in the ex-serving population
- 272 were men and 20 were women.

After adjusting for age, when compared with all Australian men*, the suicide rate was:

- 53% lower for men serving full-time**
- 46% lower for men in the reserve**
- 13% higher for ex-serving men – the comparative suicide rate for ex-serving men varied by age and was higher for those aged 18-24**.

* It was not possible to calculate valid comparisons for women.
** The difference in suicide rates was statistically significant.

Mental health of ADF returning personnel: recommendations

In March 2016, a Senate inquiry into the mental health of Australian Defence Force members and veterans found almost one in four returned soldiers had experienced a mental disorder in the previous year; the rate of suicidality was double that of the general population. The Senate committee’s report also estimated the prevalence of lifetime trauma exposure in the ADF from serving as a peacekeeper was 31.5 per cent. Since 2000, 108 ADF members were suspected or had been confirmed to have died as a result of suicide.

Following are brief explanations of the seventeen Senate recommendations regarding the mental health of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel who have returned from combat, peacekeeping or other deployment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Defence conducts annual screening for mental ill health for all ADF members.
2. The Australian National Audit Office conducts an audit into the scope and accuracy of record keeping of relevant clinical information collected or recorded during deployment regarding mental ill health or potentially traumatic incidents.
3. All veterans be issued with a universal identification number and identification card that can be linked to their service and medical record.
4. The Department of Health and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs ensure that e-health records identify veterans and that GPs are encouraged to promote annual ADF Post-discharge GP Health Assessment for all veterans.
5. Defence and DVA contact ADF members and veterans who have been administered mefloquine hydrochloride (mefloquine) during their service to advise them of the possible short-term and long-term side effects and that all ADF members and veterans who have been administered mefloquine during their service be given access to neurological assessment.
6. The report for the Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force’s inquiry to determine whether any failures in military justice have occurred regarding the Australia Defence Force’s use of mefloquine be published immediately following the completion of the inquiry.
7. The Department of Defence ensures that medical officers and mental health professionals have ready access to records of potentially traumatic events for members following their deployment.
8. The DVA Psychologists Schedule of Fees be revised to better reflect the Australian Psychological Society’s National Schedule of Recommended Fees and that any restrictions regarding the number of hours or frequency of psychologist sessions are based on achieving the best outcome and guaranteeing the safety of the veteran.
9. Eligibility requirements for the Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service (VVCS) be consolidated and broadened to include all current and former members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and their immediate families (partners, children, and carers).
10. Currently serving ADF members become eligible to access the Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service (VVCS) without referral and that the VVCS reporting obligations to the ADF be limited to situations where the VVCS believes that a member’s mental ill health will compromise their safety or the safety of others.
11. The Defence mental health awareness programs do more to emphasise the benefit of early identification and treatment of mental ill health for an ADF member’s long-term career and encourage ADF members to plan beyond their next deployment.
12. The Department of Defence and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs develops a program to engage current and former ADF members, who have successfully deployed after rehabilitation for mental ill health, to be ‘mental health champions’ to assist in the de-stigmatisation of mental ill health.
13. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs to be adequately funded to achieve a full digitisation of its records and modernisation of its ICT systems by 2020, including the introduction of a single coherent system to process and manage claims.
14. The Department of Defence works with ex-service organisations to develop a transition mentoring program, which will connect every veteran with a trained mentor from the ex-service community to assist and guide them through the transition process.
15. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs reviews its rehabilitation assessment policy to ensure that junior-ranked members are not disadvantaged and all veterans are able to access rehabilitation, education, and re-skilling based on their individual needs and abilities and regardless of rank.
16. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs identifies veterans who are receiving in-patient mental health care as at risk of homelessness and provide an ongoing psychosocial case manager to actively manage an ‘at risk’ veteran’s care program until their mental health and living situation is stable.
17. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs works together with the Department of Human Services and RSL Lifecare to develop a program to address veteran homelessness based on the Homes for Heroes ‘housing first approach’ and focus on ongoing psychosocial support.

Compiled by The Spinney Press.

Source: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Department of the Senate (March 2016), Mental health of Australian Defence Force members and veterans.
Defence White Paper
Australia joins Asia’s arms race with spending on weaponry and military forces to reach $195B

Australia will embark on a decade-long surge in weaponry and military forces to defend its land, sea, skies and space from Asia’s rapidly growing military forces. An ABC News report by Greg Jennett

The 2016 Defence White Paper maps a course towards a total of $195 billion in defence capability or equipment by 2020–21, together with a larger military force of 62,400 personnel, the largest in a quarter of a century.

Joining an Asian-region mini arms race, the White Paper promises 12 submarines to be built at a cost of more than $50 billion between 2018–2057. However, maintenance costs will push that $50 billion budget much higher.

Navy will scoop a quarter of all new spending on capability, with nine new anti-submarine warfare frigates and 12 offshore patrol vessels. The RAAF will build up two fleets of drones while also bringing its eventual fleet of 75 Joint Strike Fighters online. The Army will claim 18 per cent of all extra spending on equipment, buying armed drones, new protected vehicles to transport troops, helicopters for special forces and a long-range rocket system.

Underscoring a sense of urgency to the renewal of Australia’s defence power, the Government is aiming to build spending up to 2 per cent of GDP by 2020/21 – earlier than previously promised – representing an overall increase of $29.9 billion.

Defence officials have told the ABC the White Paper reflects Australia’s “growing discomfort” with China’s military activity.

Climate change and terrorism listed as threats
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said the Government...
NEW DEFENCE SPENDING

- The Australian government is embarking on an unprecedented military upgrade and expansion of our air, land, sea and intelligence capability to counter the rapid military build-up in Australia’s region.
- Over ten years, $195 billion will be spent on land, sea, air, intelligence, surveillance and electronic warfare assets.
- Defence Force budget spending is set to increase by $29.9 billion and personnel increased to 62,400 – the highest in more than 20 years.
- The White Paper said the Defence Force will be better equipped to face growing unease in the region, including disputes over the South China Sea.

FORCE STRUCTURE

- Increase of 5,000 new ADF personnel to strength of 62,400.

AIR: $34 BILLION

- 72 F-35A Lightning II Joint strike fighters
- 12 E/A-18G Growlers electronic attack aircraft
- New air to air, air to surface and anti-ship missile weapons
- Integrated air and missile defence systems.

LAND: $35 BILLION

- New missile armed unmanned aircraft (drones) for troop protection
- New long-range rocket and artillery program
- Attack helicopters
- Upgraded M1 Abrams battle tanks
- Fleet of light armed for river and estuarine battles.

SEA: $49 BILLION

- 12 new regionally superior submarines to replace the Collins class
- Nine new anti-submarine warfare frigates
- 12 new offshore patrol vessels
- 7 PA-8 Poseidon spy planes bringing total to 15
- Tactical drones to assist warship operations
- State of the art mine defence and countermeasures
- New land-based anti-ship missile system.

CYBER, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, SPACE: $18 BILLION

- 7 MQ4C Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft (drones)
- Upgrade of Jindalee over the horizon radar system
- Increased cyber defence capability
- Long-range Gulfstream jets for electronic warfare.

SOURCES


WHITE PAPER SHOPPING LIST

The 2016 Defence White Paper has outlined expenditure of $195 billion on military capabilities over the next 10 years.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>“Regionally superior” submarines</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Offshore patrol vessels</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Anti-submarine warfare frigates</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Hawkei light armoured vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters</td>
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<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Additional Defence personnel</td>
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<td>2,300</td>
<td>Defence personnel reassigned</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Heavy-lift C-17A Globemaster III transport aircraft</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2KC-30A air-to-air refueller aircraft</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>MQ-4C Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft</td>
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was committed to the “significant increase in spending” due to regional challenges as well as the threat from climate change and terrorism, among other issues.

The factoring in of climate change was not planned under the Abbott Government.

“In the next two decades, half the world’s submarines and at least half the world’s advanced combat aircraft will be operating in the Indo-Pacific region, in our region, and this complicates the outlook for our security and strategic planning,” Mr Turnbull said.
Defending Australia

The language of the White Paper points to a realisation that Australia needs to increase the “potency and agility” of its forces in the face of rising wealth and power in Asia, coupled with the strategic tension already arising between China and the United States.

“Territorial disputes ... have created uncertainty and tension in our region,” the White Paper notes.

“Australia continues to throw its military lot in with the United States, assessed to “remain the pre-eminent global power over the next two decades”.

As allies, we welcome the Government’s sustained investment in defence capabilities and readiness and its support for rules-based international order,” he said.

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This Defence White Paper explains how the Government is investing in Australia's defence capabilities to strengthen Australia's security in the more complex strategic environment Australia will face in the years ahead.

The Government’s policy is to align Australia’s defence strategy with capabilities and resourcing, grow our international defence partnerships to support shared security interests and invest in the partnership with Australian defence industry to develop innovative technologies and deliver essential capabilities.

Because decisions about our defence capabilities taken now will determine our capacity to manage the challenges of the future, it is important that defence decision making and planning take a clear long-term view. This Defence White Paper looks out to 2035 to identify where and what sorts of security challenges are likely to arise and what capabilities Defence – the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Department of Defence – will need to meet them. While Australia has effective defence capabilities to draw on to meet current security challenges, significant under-investment in Defence in the past and the deferral of decisions about future major capabilities need to be fixed. Defence's capability plans have become disconnected from defence strategy and resources, delaying important investments in Australia's future security and frustrating Australian defence industry.

In April 2014, the Government announced that it would deliver a new Defence White Paper to align Defence's strategy, capability and resources.

This Defence White Paper is based on a comprehensive review of Australia’s strategic environment, including the changes underway in the Indo-Pacific region, encompassing the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, and across the world and the implications of these changes for Australia and for Defence. This includes an assessment of the different challenges created by the complex dynamics between states and the ongoing threat posed by non-state actors, including terrorists that seek to launch attacks internationally, regionally and within Australia.


The Force Structure Review assessed Defence’s future capability needs and developed the force structure required to achieve Australia’s defence objectives.

An Expert Panel supported the development of the Defence White Paper together with a comprehensive consultation process which incorporated input from across Government, Australian defence industry, the Australian public, the United States, New Zealand and our other international partners.

The Defence White Paper sets out in three sections the elements of the Government’s defence policy in response to this comprehensive analysis and consideration: Strategy, Capability, and Resources.

**STRATEGY**

*Australia’s strategic outlook*

Australia and the Indo-Pacific region are in a period of significant economic transformation, leading to greater opportunities for prosperity and development. Rising incomes and living standards across the Indo-Pacific are generating increased demand for goods and services. By 2050, almost half the world’s economic output is expected to come from the Indo-Pacific. This presents opportunities to increase Australia’s economy and security as the Indo-Pacific region grows in economic and strategic weight.

The growing prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and the rules-based global order on which Australia relies for open access to our trading partners are based on the maintenance of peace and stability. Over the last 70 years that peace and stability has been underpinned by a strong United States presence in our region and globally as well as active engagement by regional states in building a rules-based order Australia’s strategic outlook to 2035 also includes a number of challenges which we need to prepare for. While there is no more than a remote prospect of a military attack by another country on Australian territory in the foreseeable future, our strategic planning is not limited to defending our borders. Our planning recognises the regional and global nature of Australia’s strategic interests and the different sets of challenges created by the behaviours of countries and non-state actors such as terrorists.

The roles of the United States and China and the relationship between them will continue to be the most strategically important factors in the Indo-Pacific region to 2035. A strong and deep alliance is at the core of Australia’s security and defence planning. The United States will remain the pre-eminent global military power and will continue to be Australia’s most important strategic partner. Through this Defence White Paper, Australia will seek to broaden and deepen our alliance with the United States, including by supporting its critical role in underpinning security in our region through the continued rebalance of United States military forces.

The stability of the rules-based global order is essential for Australia’s security and prosperity. A rules-based global order means a shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities in accordance with agreed rules which evolve over time, such as international
law and regional security arrangements. This shared commitment has become even more important with growing interconnectivity, which means that events across the world have the potential to affect Australia’s security and prosperity. The Government is committed to making practical and effective military contributions to global security operations to maintain the rules-based order and address shared security challenges where it is in our interest to do so.

Australians will continue to be threatened by terrorism at home and abroad. The spread of extremism and violence will be worsened by foreign terrorist fighters returning from conflicts to their countries of origin, including Australia and other countries in our region, and terrorist attacks by individuals inspired and radicalised by extremist messages. Over the next 20 years, it can be expected that terrorism will continue to evolve in ways which threaten Australia’s interests.

Australia is one of the most successful and most harmonious multicultural societies in the world. The highest priority of the Government is to keep the Australian community safe. To do this, the Government is working with our international partners and with Australian state and territory governments.

The Government is committed to contributing to international efforts to meet the threat of terrorism, including maintaining Australia’s significant contribution to the United States-led coalition to disrupt, degrade and ultimately defeat the terrorist threat from Daesh. Within Australia, Defence will provide important capabilities as part of our national counter-terrorism arrangements.

Instability in our immediate region could have strategic consequences for Australia and we will continue to take a leading role in providing humanitarian and security assistance where required. Within the South Pacific, variable economic growth, crime and social, governance and climate change challenges will all contribute to uneven progress and may lead to instability in some countries.

Maintaining Australia’s technological edge and capability superiority over potential adversaries is an essential element of our strategic planning. The capability superiority that Australia has traditionally maintained in the wider region will be challenged by military modernisation. Over the next 20 years a larger number of regional forces will be able to operate at greater range and with more precision than ever before. The growth in the capability of China’s military forces is the most significant example of regional military modernisation, but other countries are also undertaking extensive modernisation programs.

New and complex non-geographic security threats in cyberspace and space will be an important part of our future security environment. The cyber threat to Australia is growing. Cyber attacks are a real and present threat to the ADF’s warfighting ability as well as to other government agencies and other sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure.

**Australia’s defence strategy**

The Government’s defence strategy will ensure that Defence is prepared to respond if the Government decides the pursuit of Australia’s interests requires the use of military force. This strategy sets out three Strategic Defence Interests which are of fundamental significance for strategic defence planning. To provide more detailed guidance for planning, each Strategic Defence Interest is linked to a Strategic Defence Objective which sets out the activities the Government expects Defence to be able to conduct if it decides to use military power in support of the Strategic Defence Interests.

Our most basic Strategic Defence Interest is a secure, resilient Australia. The first Strategic Defence Objective is to deter, deny and defeat any attempt by a hostile country or non-state actor to attack, threaten or coerce Australia. The Government is providing Defence with the capability and resources it needs to be able to independently and decisively respond to military threats, including incursions into Australia’s air, sea and northern approaches.

Our second Strategic Defence Interest is in a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South-East Asia and the South Pacific. The second Strategic Defence Objective is to support the security of maritime South-East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security. In South-East Asia, Defence will strengthen its engagement, including helping to build the effectiveness of regional operations to address shared security challenges, and the ADF will have increased capabilities to make contributions to any such operations. The Government will continue its commitment to strengthened regional security architectures that support transparency and cooperation. Australia will continue to seek to be the principal security partner for Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Island Countries in the South Pacific.

Our third Strategic Defence Interest is in a stable Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order which supports our interests. The third Strategic Defence
Defending Australia

Objective is to provide meaningful contributions to global responses to address threats to the rules-based global order which threaten Australia and its interests. Australia will work closely with our ally the United States and other international partners to play an important role in coalition operations wherever Australia’s interests are engaged.

Recognising the interconnected nature of the global environment and the fact that Australia’s security and prosperity is directly affected by events outside our region, all three Strategic Defence Objectives will guide force structure and force posture decision-making in, and flowing from, this White Paper.

CAPABILITY

A more capable, agile and potent future force

The Government will ensure Australia maintains a regionally superior ADF with the highest levels of military capability and scientific and technological sophistication. The future force will be more capable, agile and potent. The future force will be more capable of conducting independent combat operations to defend Australia and protect our interests in our immediate region. This force will also enhance Australia’s ability to contribute to global coalition operations.

More emphasis will be placed on the joint force, bringing together different capabilities so the ADF can apply more force more rapidly and more effectively when required.

To provide our forces with comprehensive situational awareness, the Government is strengthening Defence’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Defence’s imagery and targeting capacity will be enhanced through greater access to strengthened analytical capability, enhanced support and space-based capabilities.

The Government will strengthen the Defence cyber workforce and systems to deter and defend against the threat of cyber attack.

Modernising our maritime capabilities will be a key focus. The submarine force will be increased from 6 to 12 regionally superior submarines with a high degree of interoperability with the United States. The surface naval capability will include three Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers and a new class of nine future frigates supported by new replenishment vessels. Defence’s ability to contribute to border protection will be enhanced with the introduction of more capable offshore patrol vessels, new manned and unmanned aircraft and a new large-hulled multi-purpose patrol vessel, the Australian Defence Vessel Ocean Protector.

The ADF will be equipped with a potent air combat and air strike capability centred around the F-35A Lightning II and the E/A-18G Growler that builds on its current fleet of F/A-18 Super Hornet, Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control and air-to-air refuelling aircraft. More air-to-air refuellers will be acquired to support future combat, surveillance and transport aircraft.

The land force will be equipped with new personal equipment for soldiers and a new generation of armoured combat reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles, as well as new combat engineering equipment. A new long-range rocket system will further enhance fire power, and armed medium-altitude unmanned aircraft will enhance surveillance and protection for the land force. The ADF’s capacity for amphibious operations will be strengthened by the introduction of new weapons and equipment for our amphibious ships. New light helicopters will be acquired to support Special Forces operations.

To ensure the ADF is able to perform at the highest level of effectiveness, the Government will fix the under-investment in the vital enabling capabilities that bind military capabilities together. The Government will upgrade ADF bases and logistics systems, including fuel and explosive ordnance facilities, and upgrade training and testing facilities, health services and information and communications technology.

The ADF’s air lift capability will be increased to comprise 8 heavy lift C-17A Globemasters with additional heavy lift aircraft to be considered in the longer term, 12 upgraded C-130J Hercules, 10 C-27J Spartans and 10 CH-47F Chinook helicopters. Sea lift capability will be strengthened by extending the life of and upgrading our current logistics ship.

With this Defence White Paper the Government has released for the first time a 10-year 2016 Integrated Investment Program, a detailed capability investment plan for the future force covering all of its major elements. It includes major acquisitions of new weapons, platforms and systems and investment in information and communications technology, infrastructure and the enabling workforce. The Integrated Investment Program is underpinned by a rigorous cost assurance program undertaken by private sector experts to provide higher levels of confidence that our plans are affordable.

Australian defence industry and innovation

The Government recognises the vital contribution to defence capability provided by Australian defence industry and science and technology research organisations. Australian defence industry provides a range of...
critical direct and support services and is a fundamental input to Defence capability. Innovation drives the development of defence capability. Defence, Australian defence industry and our national research community have a proven record of collaborating on leading-edge innovation that enhances the ADF’s capability. This includes developing new technologies and transforming the maintenance of Defence capabilities.

The Government is committed to forming a new partnership with Australian defence industry to ensure Defence gets the equipment, systems and personnel it needs on time and on budget. The Government will strengthen Defence’s collaboration with Australian defence industry, cut red tape and invest in new technologies to help build Australian defence industry competitiveness, create economic opportunity for Australians and support our nation’s defence. The Government will better link our capability needs with Australian defence industry’s capacity to deliver, and ensure that the decisions we make about defence capability take proper account of Australian defence industry.

With this White Paper the Government is releasing a new 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement focused on maximising the defence capability necessary to achieve the Government’s defence strategy. Fragmentation of current Australian defence industry programs will be addressed by consolidating numerous industry and innovation initiatives into two key initiatives that have clear and measurable outcomes for defence capability. The Government will streamline its approach to tendering and contracting to reduce red tape and make it easier for Australian defence industry to support Defence.

**Shipbuilding**
The Government’s shipbuilding plans are based on long-term continuous builds of surface warships, commencing with construction in Australia of offshore patrol vessels from 2018 and future frigates from 2020. These plans will transform Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry, generate significant economic growth, sustain Australian jobs over the coming decades and assure the long-term future of this key Australian defence industry.

The Government will ensure that the future submarine project provides a regionally superior capability and value-for-money for Australian taxpayers while maximising the involvement of Australian defence industry. The competitive evaluation process, which is underway, will provide a clear pathway for Australian defence industry to maximise its involvement in the project, without compromising capability, cost or the project schedule. More detail on the Government’s shipbuilding plans are set out in Chapter Four.

**Defence posture – more active and internationally engaged**
The Government will reshape Defence’s posture to ensure Defence is best positioned to protect Australia’s security and prosperity. This includes strengthening Defence’s international engagement and international defence relationships and arrangements, enhancing the ADF’s preparedness and investing in upgrades to the ADF’s basing and infrastructure.

**International engagement**
As Australia’s strategic environment becomes more complex it is important to further develop our international partnerships including with our allies the United States and New Zealand, and with Japan, Indonesia, India, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, China and other key partners. Defence’s international engagement is an important part of the Government’s approach to building international partnerships, which also includes trade, diplomacy, foreign aid and economic capacity building in a range of government and non-government sectors.

Defence will increase its investment in international engagement over the next 20 years to help reduce the risk of military confrontation, build interoperability with key partners and improve the coordination of responses to shared international challenges including terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

International engagement will become an integrated core function across the entire Defence portfolio, aligned with the Strategic Defence Objectives. The Defence Cooperation Program, currently providing defence assistance to 28 countries, will be enhanced to build the confidence and capacity of our important regional partners. The ADF will participate more regularly in multinational exercises and the overseas presence of Defence personnel will be gradually increased over time.

**Defence preparedness**
Higher levels of Defence preparedness will be required to support increased ADF activity in the region, while maintaining the ADF’s ability to make meaningful
contributions to global security operations where our interests are engaged. The Government has directed an increase in the ADF’s preparedness level, based on raising its overall capability and improving its sustainability on operations. More funding is being provided to ensure that the ADF has greater capacity and agility to respond to strategic risks.

**People**
The quality of our people is the foundation of Defence’s capability, effectiveness and reputation. Defence is an integrated workforce with military and civilian personnel working together across the spectrum of Defence activities. All parts of the Defence workforce will need to upgrade their skills as part of building a more capable, agile and potent future force. To meet the demands of the higher-technology future force set out in this Defence White Paper, the Government will undertake the largest single rebalance of the Defence workforce in a generation.

The Permanent ADF workforce will grow to around 62,400 over the next decade to return it to its largest size since 1993. A new contemporary workforce management model will increase the ability of ADF members to move between the Permanent ADF and Reserves to better meet their individual circumstances and best harness their skills and expertise. This will provide ADF members with more opportunities to contribute to Australia’s defence.

This Defence White Paper provides for a future Australian Public Service (APS) workforce of around 18,200 Full Time Staff Equivalent (FTE), down from 22,300 FTE in June 2012. This workforce will be rebalanced with around 1,200 new APS positions in areas critical to Defence’s future capability, including intelligence, cyber security and space-based capabilities, offset by ongoing reductions elsewhere in the APS workforce.

The strength of Defence’s leadership, and its ability to adapt and embrace a more diverse and inclusive culture, will be critical to attracting and retaining the workforce it needs for the future. Gender equality and increasing female participation in the Defence workforce and in senior leadership roles is fundamental to achieving Defence capability now and into the future. Defence has confronted the need for behavioural and attitudinal change with the release in 2012 of Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture. The cultural change program continues to strengthen Defence’s capability through creating an organisational climate focused on diversity and inclusion that will attract the best people for the job. Further details can be found in Chapter Six.

The Government is committed to investing in better health care systems for ADF members, including more medical personnel, and we will improve the links between Defence and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to better support current and former ADF members. Additional resources will provide more specialist mental health care, including for ADF Reservists and their families.

**RESOURCES**

**Reform**
In August 2014, the Government commissioned the First Principles Review to ensure that Defence is appropriately structured and organised to meet the challenges of the future. Implementing the Review will ensure Defence becomes an integrated organisation driven by a stronger strategic centre rather than a federation of separate parts. The strategic centre will set priorities, manage resources and be responsible for steering the whole organisation to implement the Government’s defence plans. The reforms are essential to delivering the Government’s plans to implement the substantial force modernisation program set out in this Defence White Paper.

**Funding**
Central to the development of this Defence White Paper has been the Government’s direction to align defence strategy, capability and resources. Addressing the growing gap between planning and resourcing by increasing defence funding will provide a sustainable basis for future investment and procurement decisions.

To deliver the capabilities set out in this Defence White Paper, the Government’s long-term funding commitment provides a new 10-year Defence budget model to 2025-26, over which period an additional $29.9 billion will be provided to Defence. Under this new budget model, the Defence budget will grow to $42.4 billion in 2020-21, reaching two per cent of Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on current projections.

The long-term nature of defence force structure planning, acquisitions and sustainment means this long-term funding commitment is critical to executing the Government’s plans for Defence. The 10-year funding model is based on a fully costed future force structure, including its equipment, infrastructure and workforce, with external validation of those costs by private sector experts. This is the first time this has been done for a Defence White Paper. This program of external validation has provided assurance that our defence strategy is affordable and achievable within the budget that has been allocated.

**Implementation**
Implementation of this Defence White Paper will be driven by Defence’s stronger strategic centre. The Minister for Defence will consider a formal strategic assessment of the alignment between Defence’s strategy, capability and resources every six months to drive the Government’s annual Defence budgeting and priority setting. These biannual reviews of our defence strategy and plans, including First Principles Review and cultural reform implementation, will ensure the Government and Defence have the flexibility to seize opportunities and manage risks as our strategic circumstances change.

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Strategic environment the most challenging Australia has faced in peace time

The Turnbull government’s Defence White Paper identifies uncertainties in the US-China relationship, the spread of violent extremism, and emerging cyber threats as key risks to Australia’s security environment in the next two decades, reports Michelle Grattan.

In what it describes as the most comprehensive such paper in Australia’s history, the government says defence spending will rise to 2% of GDP by 2020-21, three years earlier than its commitment. The paper provides a fully integrated investment program in new weapons, platforms, infrastructure and science and technology.

Spending is projected to rise from more than A$32 billion in 2016-17 to just under $59 billion in 2025-26, including $195 billion in capital investment to 2026. Capital investment will rise from 29% of the defence budget in 2016-17 to 39% in 2025-26. The majority of additional funding to 2025-26 is allocated from 2019-20, when major funding for new capabilities is required.

The paper says the roles of the US and China and their relationship will continue to be the most strategically important factors in the Indo-Pacific region to 2035.

“The United States will remain the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades,” it says. While China will not match the global strategic weight of the US, the growth of its power including its military modernisation means it will have a major impact on the region’s stability to 2035.

Though careful with its language about China, the paper bluntly highlights the dangers of its activities in the South China Sea.

“Australia opposes the use of artificial structures in the South China Sea for military purposes,” it says. “Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities.”

The planned investment in new capability over future decades includes:

- A continuous naval shipbuilding program commencing with nine replacement frigates and 12 offshore patrol vessels
- 12 new submarines – with a commitment to maximise Australian industry involvement in their acquisition and sustainment, and
- Enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space, electronic warfare and cyber capabilities.

“It is a plan to become more powerful on the land and in the skies and more commanding both on the seas and beneath them. It is a program to be more resilient in the cyber space, to be more innovative with technology, and to have greater situational awareness, thanks to our advanced intelligence capabilities.”
There will be comprehensive upgrades to defence infrastructure across Australia to support a larger future force.

Six key drivers will shape Australia’s security environment in the next two decades, the paper says.

These are:
- The role of the US and China and their relationship
- Challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order
- The enduring threat of terrorism
- State fragility within our immediate neighbourhood
- The pace of military modernisation and the development of more capable military forces, and
- The emergence of new complex, non-geographical threats, including cyber threats.

Launching the paper, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said: “This white paper is a plan to deliver a more potent and agile and engaged defence force that is ready to respond whenever our interests are threatened or our help is needed.”

“It is a plan to become more powerful on the land and in the skies and more commanding both on the seas and beneath them. It is a program to be more resilient in the cyber space, to be more innovative with technology, and to have greater situational awareness, thanks to our advanced intelligence capabilities.”

The government was committed to this significant increase in spending for two reasons. “We recognise that Australia’s strategic environment is the most dynamic and challenging one that we have faced in peace time. We are also susceptible to the potential threats of conflict, climate change, malicious cyber activists, pandemic disease and transnational terrorism.”

Turnbull admitted that the quickening pace of defence spending had an impact on budget repair but said “it is part of a critically important investment in ensuring that our defence forces have the capability they need”.

Turnbull was anxious to emphasise that the white paper was “more than simply a road map to achieve a strong and sustainable defence capability”.

“Our investments in Australian industry and technologies will generate benefits beyond the Australian defence industrial base. It is worth remembering that some of our most significant technology of the 20th and 21st centuries originated as military investments.”

The government will invest $1.6 billion over ten years in programs to build industry skills, drive competitiveness and export potential while harnessing innovation and expertise.

Labor spokesman Stephen Conroy said the opposition was broadly supportive of the white paper, although it would closely scrutinise the funding commitment.

But he noted that it had not promised to build the submarines in South Australia.

He said the government should call the Chinese ambassador in and ask for an explanation of its activity in the South China Sea.

US ambassador John Berry said the white paper "represents a well-considered, comprehensive approach to addressing evolving security challenges of the coming decades.

“As allies, we welcome the government’s sustained investment in defence capabilities and readiness and its support for rules-based international order,” Berry said.

Update

The ABC reports that Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said China was “dissatisfied” with what it saw as the white paper’s “negative” comments about the South China Sea.

Hua said the paper mentioned Australia was willing to enhance cooperation with China, which China welcomed, hoping these positive statements could be translated into concrete actions.

“We also noticed that this White Paper made some remarks about South China Sea and East China Sea. These remarks are negative and we are dissatisfied about this.”

Michelle Grattan is Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra.

THE CONVERSATION

THE 2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER: GOOD POSTURE

A wide brown land needs a big, big defence policy and Australia has received that very thing with the delivery of the 2016 Defence White Paper, observes Peter Jennings from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Conceived in 2013, gestating like a humongous pearl in 2014 and 2015, the 2016 White Paper largely lives up to its self-made claim to be “deliberate, rigorous and methodical”. Although a close read occasionally points to the White Paper’s mixed parentage – the words ‘agile’ and ‘innovative’ are salted through the text – this is a document that sets out a clear strategy, a logically-articulated force structure and – can you believe it – a plausible funding plan.

The strategy all hinges on the money. To the extent that any government can commit their heirs and successors, this White Paper locks in a promise to reach a defence budget “just ahead” of 2% of gross domestic product in 2020-21. That’s three years in advance of Tony Abbott’s pledge to reach 2% of GDP in 2023-24. Some decry the value of the 2% target, but it kept both Government and Opposition focused on security at a time when others would have happily ditched the spending promise.

On strategic outlook, the White Paper makes a compelling case for being concerned about a generally deteriorating situation. It does so after a throat-clearing reference to the “greater opportunities for prosperity and development” afforded by generally exciting times. But opportunities for positive excitement can only be realised if prosperity stays underpinned by peace and stability.

The risks are elaborated: cyber attacks are “a real and present threat”; there will be “greater uncertainty” for at least the next two decades; serious “points of friction” are emerging between China and the US; Russia emerges increasingly “coercive and aggressive”; terrorism is growing and regional countries aren’t well-placed to handle it; the South China Sea “will continue to provide a source of tension that could undermine stability”; and so on.

The list of risks isn’t exaggerated and they cumulatively point to the need for a stronger set of military capabilities and an Australian Defence Force more engaged in Indo-Pacific regional security cooperation.

Here it’s worth noting that the 2016 White Paper makes more of Defence ‘posture’ than any of its predecessors. 'Posture' in this sense means what you do with the Defence Force you already have. That’s the real start of planning for the defence force we would like to have and might get if funding assumptions hold.

Three “Strategic Defence Interests” are said to shape policy decisions. These are: one, having the capacity to deter or defeat any attack on, or attempt to coerce, Australia. Two, securing our nearer region of “maritime South-East Asia” and the Pacific; and three, contributing to a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.

Fundamentally it’s the second of those priorities that drives key posture and future force structure decision-making. The White Paper...
can be seen as the concluding verse to the generation-long saga of the Defence of Australia (DOA) strategy. ‘DOA’ is now fully effected in a maritime strategy focused on South-East Asia and the Pacific.

Defence’s international engagement effort is projected to grow renewed priority for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. ADF readiness levels are to be raised to allow for a more sustained ADF presence in the region – a potentially expensive decision. The numbers of ADF and Defence civilian personnel posted overseas will increase, but there are few details about how that will be done.

Almost every major relationship in the Indo-Pacific is projected to grow. The document is bullish on prospects for cooperation with Indonesia. Areas identified for more cooperation include counter-terrorism, maritime engagement, HADR, peacekeeping and intelligence. Interestingly, the White Paper refers to the modernisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces as a “positive development” in regional security and anticipates that Australia could support that process.

The paragraphs on Japan show how far the bilateral relationship has come even before any final decision is made on the preferred submarine design. Identified areas for cooperation include intelligence, developing common capabilities like the Joint Strike Fighter, air and missile defence and maritime warfare technologies. It’s perhaps not unconnected with a statement in the section on missile defence which says that Australia will participate in a bilateral working group with the US to examine “options for potential Australian contributions to integrated air and missile defence in the region”.

On China, the White Paper is measured and restrained. It talks rather soberly of the “productive working relationship” on Defence matters and stresses in several places that China has an opportunity to step forward to play its own role in regional peace and stability in “North Asia and the Indo-Pacific.”

The Paper is concerned about the South China Sea becoming a source of tension that could undermine stability. It pointedly says that “Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities”. It pronounces that countries should be “open and transparent about end-state purposes of land reclamation activities”.

Well, a White Paper would have to say something like that, wouldn’t it? The “end state purposes” of China’s activities in the South China Sea are pretty obvious, even to the half-blind dugongs that might once have swum around Mischief Reef.

Although Tony Abbott’s rhetorical flourish of the “long, strong arm” of the ADF is behind us, the White Paper preserves a welcome commitment to thinking about Australian strategic interests on a global canvas.

Apart from the US, New Zealand and the Pacific, the section on engagement also highlights Australia’s productive defence links with the UK, NATO, the UN, France, Spain, Canada, the Netherlands, and Germany. This is a welcome change and points to a growing maturity around the thought that Australia can do the strategic equivalent of walking and chewing gum.

When it comes to defence thinking we can be both global and local – a skill demanded of us by our increasingly risky strategic environment.

Peter Jennings is executive director at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Defence White Paper: five key questions

COMMENTARY FROM DEFENCE STRATEGY EXPERT, ROSS BABBAGE

The new Defence White Paper is an advance on many fronts. Its appreciation of the changing security landscape is accurate, its logic is mostly clear and it contains a government commitment to spend significantly more, for at least the coming decade.

However, the more I examine the detail in this White Paper, the more concerned I become. Several key challenges deserve closer consideration. Let me touch on five.

My first question is whether the White Paper proposes an adequate response to the more demanding security environment that seems to be in store for the 2030s.

It rightly points out that in the 2030s China’s defence spending is likely to exceed that of the US and that Beijing’s military investments will be concentrated overwhelmingly in East and South-East Asia. The speed, scale and asymmetric nature of PLA development and Beijing’s confrontational behaviour are already transforming the regional security outlook.

Meanwhile, Washington has been responding to international security challenges with great caution, hesitancy and inconsistency. One consequence is that while China’s defence spending has quadrupled in the last decade, American defence spending has increased by a total of only 12%.

For Australia the challenges may be truly daunting by the 2030s. If a core responsibility of Australian defence planners is to ensure that future Australian governments will always have capabilities to respond effectively to future security crises, will this White Paper deliver enough?

My second question is whether the strategy in this White Paper is sufficiently focussed.

The strategy described in the White Paper has three core priorities. The first is to deter, deny or defeat any attempt to attack, threaten or coerce Australia. The second is to work with regional neighbours to foster a more resilient and secure South-East Asia and South-West Pacific. And the third priority is to reinforce a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based international order.

However, in a major departure from its predecessors, this White Paper announces that all three of those priorities are to have equal weighting in force structure design and development. In the past, all three have been accorded roughly equal weighting in ADF activities but the design and development of the ADF has been driven primarily by the most vital tasks; the deterrence, denial and defeat of any attempt to attack, threaten or coerce Australia.

There’s no explanation for this substantial broadening of the criteria for force structure design in either the White Paper or the accompanying Integrated Investment Program. It’s just announced.

For Australia the challenges may be truly daunting by the 2030s. If a core responsibility of Australian defence planners is to ensure that future Australian governments will always have capabilities to respond effectively to future security crises, will this White Paper deliver enough?

That decision is counter-intuitive. One would think that when the country is needing to face up to the demands of a far more challenging security environment and a significantly increased risk of direct military threat in the decades ahead, defence planners would focus acquisition spending on the vital priorities. Nevertheless, this White Paper states that equal investment priority will be given to other types of operations, activities and theatres that don’t pose an existential threat to the country.

In 2035 China’s military spending is projected to be some 40 times that of Australia. But here we have a decision to spend two-thirds of this country’s comparatively small acquisition budget on capabilities that aren’t priorities for the main game.

There are important consequences. One is that if Australia was to be seriously threatened in the 2030s or 40s, the ADF’s capabilities to defend the country would be significantly weaker than would otherwise be the case. Second, were the Australian public to realise that only one third of the country’s meagre defence acquisition budget was being spent on the direct defence of Australia, they’re likely to be unimpressed.

Public opinion polling for the last half century has consistently shown overwhelming support for the ADF being structured to directly defend the country but low...
support for defence operations for other purposes in distant theatres.

In my view, it’s highly desirable that Australia conduct operations in our regional approaches and in support of global security and that all of these tasks be priorities for future ADF activities. We certainly should contribute to the fight against terrorism in the Middle East, we should work hard to build security resilience in South-East Asia and we should lead emergency responses to natural disasters in the South-West Pacific.

However, giving those sorts of tasks equal weight with the requirements of directly defending Australia in what we buy for the Defence Force is a major change. Moreover the case for this substantial dilution of strategic focus in defence acquisitions has yet to be made.

A third important question is whether it will be possible to sustain the political will to fully fund the defence modernisation program in the White Paper over the coming decade. Locking the defence budget into a 10-year funding model may be sensible business practice but it’ll be challenging to maintain.

A fourth major question arises from the substantial restructuring of the defence workforce that’ll be needed to operate the new intelligence, space, cyber and the maritime, air and land force combat capabilities that the White Paper details. Many current staff don’t possess the required backgrounds or skills and will need to be relocated elsewhere. Simultaneously Defence will be striving to attract and retain the range of highly capable people that the new functions will require.

My final key question arises from the Defence Industry Policy Statement that’s attached to the White Paper. This statement breaks new ground on many fronts and is to be welcomed.

However, in order to succeed, the new industry policy and indeed the new capabilities listed in the White Paper, will need industry to perform to higher standards of quality, timeliness and cost control than have been seen in the past. It will require a different, innovative and flexible culture in both Defence and in relevant companies.

Ross Babbage is a former senior Defence official and Managing Director of Strategy International.

THE END OF 2%: AUSTRALIA GETS SERIOUS ABOUT ITS DEFENCE BUDGET

The new Defence White Paper marks a return to seriousness in the Government’s approach to spending, observe Daniel Baldino and Andrew Carr

Compared to Tony Abbott, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and his defence minister, Marise Payne, see themselves as having a different emphasis in the way they view security challenges, how Australia should fund its defence, and different philosophies for how to protect the nation’s interests in our region.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Australia’s new Defence White Paper. It seeks a certain product differentiation to Abbott’s often idiosyncratic, and arguably crude, strategic posturing.

BUDGET CONCERNS

The biggest return to seriousness is the document’s approach to the defence budget. While media reporting and even the White Paper itself highlights that the defence spending target of 2% of GDP will remain, the link between what the Australian Defence Force gets and the health of the economy has been unmistakably broken.

Rather than stating that “2%” was all that would be needed to fix Australia’s defence spending bottom line each year, the white paper uses the 2% target as a once-off only. The projection of what this figure will be in 2025-26 is around A$58.7 billion. This is up from A$32 billion in the next financial year.

The paper explicitly says:

The ten-year funding model will not be subject to any further adjustments as a result of changes in Australia’s GDP growth estimates.

So, even if growth slows, Australia’s economic fortunes will not dictate the share of government spending defence has. This is a sensible and well-considered move. The 2% target was an “arbitrary” number, as Turnbull recognised. Australia’s security bears no relation to whether we meet this target. By putting the funding first, any hopes for good planning and efficiency would be curtailed.

STRATEGIC THINKING

Another serious contribution is the paper’s attempt to link threats to national security and economic prosperity with capability planning and what sort of military upgrades and investments will best help resolve these problems.

This paper attempts to actually ‘do’ strategy. It presents a cohesive ethos in style as well as substance. It is measured in its judgements, keeps Australian interests at the forefront and is cautious of friends and foes.

That can’t be said of some past efforts. The more confrontational 2009 White Paper pointed to China’s rise as a concern, stated the intention to buy 12 submarines, and left everyone else to fill in the blanks about how the latter dealt with the former.

There are components of China’s recent behaviour, including in the South China Sea, that are deeply troubling. The White Paper does not put this issue on ice, but instead stresses the need for:

... a stable, rules-based global order which supports the peaceful resolution of disputes, facilitates

No government gets everything right. Concerns and disagreements about defence capability or force structure and acquisition will still abound. And any good policy will not necessarily sell itself.

MILITARY SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE (% OF GDP

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free and open trade and enables unfettered access to the global commons to support economic development.

To better appreciate the increasing complexity of such big strategic issues, careless and emotive rhetoric that takes contemporary problems and reframes them in the simplistic clothing of past eras should be avoided.

So, it was disappointing to see Turnbull mimic Abbott’s line that in 2012 defence spending had been reduced to the “lowest level since 1938”. Turnbull is right, though, to complain about the A$16 billion or more that Defence lost under Julia Gillard and the harm it did to impending decisions related to designs, process and capacity.

But there is no comparison between the two eras. Australia had 10,000 personnel in its defence force in 1938. Today it has 58,000 and that will grow to 63,000. Australia has 18,000 public servants looking at threats, guiding policy and planning for security. In 1938, this number was just 57.

Turnbull and Payne were wise to explicitly reject the use of GDP as the basis for analysis in their figures. They should ensure they also do so in their political rhetoric. It suggests a flippancy about these issues that undermines the serious and considered nature of the document they have just released.

A more cautious approach seems to have been taken to defence engagement. Excessive claims about the practice creating new habits and norms that would bring peace to Asia have been quietly dropped. Instead, there is a focus on practical co-operation – such as responding to Flight MH370 – and training with allies.

The paper still makes some ambitious and questionable claims. NATO gets a strong run. There’s a hint of belief that the China challenge can be abated if more defence personnel from Australia and China talk to one another.

Payne declared that defence engagement was a “core defence function”. Yet there’s at least regular caveats that co-operation with countries in places like the Middle East occurs “where it is in our interest do so”.

If that’s the standard – with benefits and improvements today and tomorrow the main concern rather than re-aligning the world in 20 years’ time – then it should be applauded.

INTO THE FUTURE

No government gets everything right. Concerns and disagreements about defence capability or force structure and acquisition will still abound. And any good policy will not necessarily sell itself.

But part of a more visionary, responsible approach to leadership requires avoiding preoccupation with immediate and too-often-ideological pet projects. It appreciates that new threats might require new forms of action, comprising items like cyber and space warfare units as well as reconnaissance aircraft.

This also means recognising that accurately predicting the future is a perilous business. In 2035, Australia may look back and wish it had spent more. Or it may realise it overspent and misunderstood or misinterpreted threats.

But to the White Paper’s credit, it has recognised the current environment’s uncertainties and tried to respond seriously, neither hiding nor panicking about Australia’s preparedness. This is long overdue.

In doing so, the overall presentation of a strategic rationale that attempts to align policy prescriptions, political priorities and shifting international circumstances indicates a welcome return to a more mature, serious debate about the use of Australia’s military and diplomatic assets.

Daniel Baldino is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of Notre Dame Australia.

Andrew Carr is Research Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National University.

THE CONVERSATION

WHAT DO WE WANT FROM AUSTRALIA’S NEW SUBMARINES?

JANIS COCKING EXPLAINS THE REASONING BEHIND AUSTRALIA’S DECISION TO DOUBLE ITS SUBMARINE FLEET AT VAST EXPENSE

The Australian government’s decision to spend A$50 billion to double its submarine fleet to 12 was based on a number of considerations about what the new submarines would be required to do.

In military parlance, the value of submarines can be discussed in terms of the missions they can carry out and the military effects they can create, such as:

- **Sea denial** – the threat of attack by submarines can deny an adversary the use of a strategic area of the sea. An example is the exclusion zone that British submarines enforced around the Falklands Islands in the war with Argentina in 1982.
- **Maritime strike** – the ability to attack and destroy enemy forces and capabilities.
- **Intelligence collection** – which can take several forms, such as the gathering of technical information about the capabilities and operational practices of enemy forces, or information that indicates the current or future intentions of an adversary.

The missions

Submarines carry out various kinds of missions, including:

- **Anti-surface warfare** – attacking ships, either merchant shipping carrying supplies or naval ships. This has always been the primary role of most submarines.
- **Anti-submarine warfare** – submarines can be employed to track and possibly attack other submarines, contributing to anti-submarine operations, which are likely to involve surface ships and maritime aircraft as well. Anti-submarine warfare demands a higher level of capability and proficiency than anti-surface warfare and not all submarines are capable of carrying out this role.

Estimating the capability offered by submarines of a particular design is done through a combination of systems performance analysis and operations analysis.

Sustained presence involves requirements for the endurance, the length of time that the presence of the submarine must be sustained, and the number of operational areas that need to be covered.

The design

There are a multitude of inter-connected drivers in the design of a submarine. These drivers can be modelled starting with high-level requirements for sustained presence and the missions to be undertaken.

The drivers result in a design involving the synthesis and integration of many complex systems and subsystems. To provide a context for this, a Collins class submarine has about 500,000 parts to be assembled. This is about five times as many parts as a large commercial airliner and about three times as many as a frigate.

Nevertheless, the important characteristics of submarines can be understood in terms of a few basic building blocks. These are the hull and the manoeuvring control systems, the propulsion system, power and energy, stealth, habitability and the combat system.

Generally the back half of a submarine is devoted to propulsion systems, which for a diesel-electric submarine means the diesel generators, the main electric motor and the electrical power conversion and control equipment.

The front half contains the control room where the sensor information is processed and the submarine is commanded, the crew’s living quarters and the...
weapon stowage. Tanks containing fuel and fresh water are distributed around the submarine. The batteries are located along the bottom of the hull where they also act as ballast.

Diesel-electric submarines store electrical energy in a large set of batteries, which are recharged using a diesel generator. While fully submerged, traditional diesel-electric submarines use a battery-powered electric motor to turn the propeller.

Because there are few moving parts with electric drive, a diesel-electric submarine can be extremely quiet when running on batteries.

**Submerged**
The length of time a diesel-electric submarine can stay fully submerged is limited by the amount of energy that can be stored in the battery. The submerged endurance of a diesel-electric submarine while running on its battery depends on its speed for two reasons.

First, the hydrodynamic resistance to moving through water increases steeply as speed increases.

Second, the total amount of energy that can be extracted from a lead-acid battery reduces the faster it is discharged. This means that while a submarine might be able to stay submerged for a few days if it travels slowly, it could exhaust its battery in an hour or two travelling at maximum speed.

Understanding the power requirements of submarines and their interplay with stealth is a key determinant in the design of a submarine. There are two major components that affect the need for power.

One is the power required for propulsion, mentioned above. There is also the power required for the crew (including atmosphere control, victuals and garbage management), for data processing associated with the sensor and combat systems, the platform subsystems and delivery of weapons and countermeasures.

This second component is virtually independent of speed and is sometimes called the 'hotel load'.

**Silent running**
The ability of a submarine to operate successfully hinges on its stealth. Stealth underpins survivability and mission success in high-threat environments.

Once a submarine is detected, its mission may be compromised and it is liable to be tracked and destroyed. The ability to remain underwater is paramount to submarine stealth and survivability.

The primary way to detect a submerged submarine is sonar (detection of underwater sound), leading to an ongoing endeavour to make submarines increasingly quieter and harder to detect.

There are two types of anti-submarine sonars: active
Submarines for future defence

- French company DCNS has beaten competitors from Germany and Japan to secure the contract to build Australia’s next fleet of submarines which will replace the current Collins Class fleet.
- The much anticipated $50 billion contract was settled in April 2016 and ensures the 12 new submarines will be built at Adelaide’s Osborne shipyards.
- French company DCNS had won the bid to build a modified diesel-powered version of its nuclear submarine called the Shortfin Barracuda.
- The 12 submarines will be built in Adelaide and the project will create 2,800 Australian jobs.
- The Government confirmed that while the bulk of the submarine build will occur in Adelaide, components will come from other parts of the country and the United States. The exact percentage of the build that will take place in Australia has not been revealed to date.
- A key priority in Australia’s defence strategy is the protection of critical lines of trade and communication for essential national transport and military operations, and denying the use of the sea to a potential adversary. Because of their unique characteristics, submarines will play an essential role in these endeavours. Their ability to restrict the actions of any would-be aggressor in the maritime domain remains unmatched. And despite the rate of technological change, they are unlikely to be challenged for at least a generation.
- Submarines have the ability to operate covertly for extended periods and to attack with devastating lethality without warning. This means they can create uncertainty in the mind of an adversary about where they are and whether it is safe to sail ships or submarines. And the larger the submarine force, the greater that uncertainty.
- Their stealth has a pre-conflict value too. In times of tension, such uncertainty can be a vital inhibitor to a would-be aggressor. Submarines can also be used to gather information about other countries’ capabilities or intentions, providing early warning of an attack.
- Submarines can also be used for strike missions, including inserting special forces ashore to target enemy facilities. Submarines equipped with land-attack missiles can also be an effective means to target onshore facilities and this capability may be an option for Australia in the future.

SOURCES
Goldrick, J (28 April 2016), ‘Why does Australia need submarines at all?’, The Conversation.

Why 12 submarines?
A key measure of submarine capability is the level of presence that the fleet as a whole can sustain in operational areas. The level of presence depends on the availability of submarines for operations.

Every submarine goes through a cycle of availability and periods of maintenance. Once or twice during the life of a submarine it will be docked for a deep maintenance period lasting a year or more.

During deep maintenance, the pressure hull may be opened to allow access to major machinery to be repaired or upgraded. Major capability upgrades requiring new masts or sonar arrays may be carried out during deep maintenance.

In addition to the deep maintenance periods, there may be mid-cycle docking for extended, but lesser, maintenance lasting several months.

When a submarine emerges from a major maintenance period, it needs to spend some time working up at sea. During this time, its systems are tested and the crew complete drills and training before deploying on operations.

It is an inescapable fact that for any submarine fleet about half of the boats will be unavailable for operations at any time. The smaller the fleet, the more susceptible it is to fluctuations in availability.

Janis Cocking is Chief of Science Strategy and Program Division, Defence Science and Technology Organisation.

Defending Australia

DEFENCE WHITE PAPER: CHINA, AUSTRALIA AND THE US REBALANCE

Australia’s strategic future in the context of US-China relations will be decided by Washington and Beijing, with little input from Canberra, observes Feng Zhang.

Australia enters China’s strategic landscape because of its role as a close military ally of the US. It’s seen by many inside China as the ‘southern anchor’ of America’s alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet, when compared with Japan, the ‘northern anchor’ of this system, Australia has never generated the same amount of frustration or anxiety among Chinese policymakers.

Geography and history combine to produce different security dynamics in China-Australia relations, compared with China-Japan relations, despite Australia and Japan’s identical roles as a close US ally. Since the end of the Cold War, Australia has occasionally been a minor nuisance to China’s strategic planning – rarely a headache, let alone a preoccupation.

But, as the Australian government’s 2016 Defence White Paper points out, the strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific region is changing fast, and Australia must cope with a new set of security uncertainties and risks. Can the current, relatively uneventful security relationship between Australia and China last under changing circumstances?

The US rebalance to Asia and China’s recent policies in the South China Sea are intensifying strategic competition between the two countries; it’s also increasingly straining the Australia-China security relationship. China was likely embarrassed by the two US freedom of navigation operations carried out in October 2015 and January 2016. It’s not happy with Australia’s air patrols in the South China Sea either, even though the public reaction hasn’t been strong.

Beijing will pay close attention to what the document says about the US rebalance to the region. Chinese officials aren’t so naïve as to expect Australia to lean toward China in the current strategic environment, but they’ll be looking for signs of change in Australia’s strategy toward China’s rise (such as a more forceful military doctrine targeting China), especially if such change is of a long-term nature.

In those respects, the DWP doesn’t send an encouraging signal to Beijing. On the South China Sea, it states that “Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities”. Furthermore, it declares that “Australia opposes the use of artificial structures in the South China Sea for military purposes”. And that Australia strongly supports freedom of navigation and overflight as well as the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law.

Those statements make it clear that Australia is supporting the US in opposing China’s island construction in the South China Sea. Judging by its air patrols, Australia is the US’s most active regional ally in asserting military power and The strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific region is changing fast, and Australia must cope with a new set of security uncertainties and risks. Can the current, relatively uneventful security relationship between Australia and China last under changing circumstances?
rhetorical messaging to oppose Chinese activities – even more so than the Philippines has been.

So it isn’t surprising that China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson described the DWP’s positions on the South China Sea as “negative”, nor that Beijing was said to be “seriously concerned and dissatisfied” with this part of the document.

The US and ASEAN released a relevant joint declaration following the Sunnylands summit held in California in February. The document reaffirmed a set of general principles for managing maritime disputes but contained no specific reference to China or the South China Sea. After initial concerns, Beijing was relieved by the moderate tone of the joint declaration and largely chose to ignore it. Beijing might well have hoped for a similar treatment of the South China Sea from the Australian DWP. But Canberra has chosen to eliminate all ambiguities by pointing the finger at China.

Can Beijing hope for a somewhat independent or balanced Australian analysis of the changing Indo-Pacific regional order? The DWP’s treatment of the US rebalance doesn’t inspire confidence. It’s clear that Australia is supporting the US when it comes to defence strategy.

As the DWP’s executive summary declares, “Australia will seek to broaden and deepen our alliance with the US, including by supporting its critical role in underpinning security in our region through the continued rebalance of the United States military forces.” To be sure, the DWP also commits Australia to developing defence relations with China. But compared to defence relations with the US, the policy of developing defence ties with China appears no more than a token inclusion to prevent the Australia-China strategic relationship from deteriorating.

Australia’s firm commitment to its alliance with the US should come as no surprise to Beijing. So perhaps Beijing should simply accept Australia’s strong support for the US rebalance as a consequence of its actions in the South China Sea.

Still, it’s debatable whether the US strategy of rebalance is the best option available for ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Since many inside China see the rebalance as a US attempt to check Chinese influence (if not contain it), Australia’s support for the US has the potential to make it a strategic rival of China, which isn’t in Australia’s best interests. Besides, does Canberra really believe that the US attempt to maintain the status quo of US primacy – if that’s possible – is the best way to contribute to stability in the region during China’s rise?

As the DWP establishes, Australia has operated with the US in every major conflict since the First World War, including recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Will Australia follow the US into a possible clash with China? It’s a legitimate question...
Australia’s support for the US has the potential to make it a strategic rival of China, which isn’t in Australia’s best interests.

to ask of the DWP, and the DWP content on this topic (which professes unconditional support for US strategy of rebalance) is surprisingly biased and shortsighted. One would hope for a more critical – or at least balanced – view of US strategy and a more long-term take on China that goes beyond the current island construction in the South China Sea.

This involves two things: first, China’s South China Sea policy reflects the current inclinations of Xi Jinping’s leadership, so it could change in the future; and second, strategy needs to reflect the long-term trend of a changing power balance in the Indo-Pacific as China rises.

If Australia’s strategy toward China follows the DWP’s proposal of making Australia an appendage of the US rebalance, Canberra should desperately hope that the US and China will be able to find a modus vivendi in their strategic competition, in order to avoid breaking its security relationship with China. The irony, of course, is that Australia’s strategic future in the context of US-China relations will be decided by Washington and Beijing, with little input from Canberra.

Feng Zhang is a fellow in the Department of International Relations, the Australian National University and a visiting scholar at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore and the Guangdong Institute of International Strategy in Guangzhou, China.

WORKSHEETS AND ACTIVITIES

The Exploring Issues section comprises a range of ready-to-use worksheets featuring activities which relate to facts and views raised in this book.

The exercises presented in these worksheets are suitable for use by students at middle secondary school level and beyond. Some of the activities may be explored either individually or as a group.

As the information in this book is compiled from a number of different sources, readers are prompted to consider the origin of the text and to critically evaluate the questions presented.

Is the information cited from a primary or secondary source? Are you being presented with facts or opinions?

Is there any evidence of a particular bias or agenda? What are your own views after having explored the issues?

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Brainstorm, individually or as a group, to find out what you know about Australia’s defence.

1. What is the Australian Defence Force?

2. What is the mission of the Australian Defence Force?

3. What is peacebuilding and how does it differ from peacekeeping?

4. What is ANZUS, and what is its military importance to Australia?
WRITTEN ACTIVITIES

Complete the following activity on a separate sheet of paper if more space is required.

1. What is the strategic direction of the Australian Defence Force, as identified in the latest Defence White Paper?

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2. Identify one of Australia’s current defence force operations and research its progress online. Outline the key details of your nominated operation and assess its strategic value to Australia.

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3. During the past decade, Australia’s contributions to United Nations peacekeeping have continued to decline. Outline Australia’s current peacekeeping roles around the globe.

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4. Women have only been allowed to serve with men in the Australian Defence Force since the 1970s, and now make up 15% of the full-time force. Detail what changes have happened in relation to women serving in the ADF, such as the removal of gender restrictions and introduction of anti-discrimination measures.

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Complete the following activities on a separate sheet of paper if more space is required.

Form into groups of two or more people and write a design brief for a poster promoting recruitment of women into the Australian Defence Force. In the brief, explain the roles available to women across the army, navy and airforce. Also explain recent changes in Defence policy and practice which have been aimed at reducing gender restrictions and improving opportunities for women to serve their country on a more equal footing. Include suggestions for text and images to maximise the appeal of your message. Share your ideas with other groups in the class.

A 2016 Senate inquiry into the mental health of Australian Defence Force members and veterans found nearly one in four returned soldiers had experienced a mental disorder in the previous 12 months; the rate of suicidality was double that of the general population. The inquiry’s findings also noted the estimated prevalence of lifetime trauma exposure in the ADF from serving as a peacekeeper was 31.5 per cent. Write a design brief for a brochure promoting help seeking for ADF personnel who may be experiencing mental health challenges. In the brief, explain what mental health issues confront serving ADF personnel and veterans, and explain what support is available for prevention and treatment. Include suggestions for text and images to strengthen the impact of your message. Share your ideas with other groups in the class.
Complete the following activity on a separate sheet of paper if more space is required.

*It is important to restore public trust in the decision to go to war. For this, better democratic accountability is essential.*

James Brown, *When Australia goes to war, public trust depends on better oversight.*

When should Australia make a decision to go to war? Read the article ‘When Australia goes to war, public trust depends on better oversight’ (pp. 14-15), and consider the 10 questions proposed by the author aimed at assisting our leaders when deciding whether or not to commit to war (see list below).

Form into groups of two or more people and discuss these 10 points with your own group using one or more examples from recent or current conflicts in which Australia has had military involvement. Using the space below, itemise your group’s concerns and then discuss with other groups in the class.

1. Are our vital national interests threatened?
2. Is there a clear political objective?
3. Are our military aims linked to this political objective?
4. Can the case be made to the Australian people that this campaign is in their interests, and can their support for the campaign be sustained through casualties and setbacks?
5. Do we understand the costs – to the country, to civilian victims, to the enemy and to our veterans?
6. What new dangers might this campaign cause?
7. What proportion of the Australian Defence Force will it commit?
8. What options will close to us if we take this action, and if we don’t?
9. Will the opposition remain committed, should it form government?
10. How does this end?
Multiple Choice

Complete the following multiple choice questionnaire by circling or matching your preferred responses. The answers are at the end of the next page.

1. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) was founded in its current form in which year?
   a. 1901
   b. 1921
   c. 1969
   d. 1976
   e. 1996
   f. 2010

2. The Australia Defence Force (ADF) consists of which of the following branches? (circle all which apply)
   a. Army
   b. Marine corps
   c. Navy
   d. Coast guard
   e. Air force
   f. Federal police
   g. Department of Defence

3. Which of the following countries are signatories of the ANZUS treaty? (circle all which apply)
   a. Austria
   b. Ukraine
   c. Australia
   d. Serbia
   e. United States
   f. New Zealand
   g. Zambia

4. The primary role of Defence is to:
   a. Advance Australia’s national interests
   b. Support Australia’s major allies in military conflicts
   c. Maintain peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations
   d. Counter-terrorism
   e. Defend Australia against armed attack
   f. Attack countries which threaten Australia’s national sovereignty

5. Women currently make up what percentage of full-time serving personnel in the Australian Defence Force (ADF):
   a. 5%
   b. 15%
   c. 18%
   d. 25%
   e. 28%
   f. 38%
6. Match the following conflicts which involved Australian defence forces with their corresponding historical dates:

- **a.** Second Gulf War (Iraq)  
  - **1.** 1899-1902
- **b.** War in Afghanistan  
  - **2.** 1900-1901
- **c.** First Gulf War (Iraq)  
  - **3.** 1914-1918
- **d.** Vietnam War  
  - **4.** 1939-1945
- **e.** Indonesian Confrontation  
  - **5.** 1946-1951
- **f.** Malayan Emergency  
  - **6.** 1950-1953
- **g.** Korean War  
  - **7.** 1950-1960
- **h.** Occupation of Japan  
  - **8.** 1963-1966
- **i.** Second World War  
  - **9.** 1962-1975
- **j.** First World War  
  - **10.** 1990-1991
- **k.** Boxer Rebellion (China)  
  - **11.** 2001-present
- **l.** Boer War (South Africa)  
  - **12.** 2003-2009
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is the military organisation responsible for the defence of Australia. It consists of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Australian Army, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and a number of ‘tri-service’ units. (p.1)

The Australian Defence Force has a strength of just over 80,000 full-time personnel and active reservists, and is supported by the Department of Defence and several other civilian agencies. (p.1)

The Australian Defence Force’s current priorities are set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper, which identifies three main areas of focus. The first of these is to defend Australia from direct attack or coercion. The second priority is to contribute to the security of South-East Asia and the South Pacific. The third priority is to contribute to stability across the Indo-Pacific region and a “rules-based global order which supports our interests”. The White Paper states that the government will place equal weight on the three priorities when developing the ADF’s capabilities. (p.1)

The primary role of Defence is to defend Australia against armed attack. Australia’s defence policy is founded on the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia, but with a capacity to do more where there are shared interests with partners and allies. (p.2)

The Government has deployed Australian Defence Force personnel to operations overseas and within Australia to protect the nation and its interests. ADF members are actively protecting Australia’s borders and offshore maritime interests. In September 2015, 2,241 ADF personnel were currently deployed on operations in Australian territory and overseas. (p.6)

Australia has been actively involved in peace operations for nearly 70 years. We have provided military and police personnel to more than 60 United Nations and other multilateral peace and security operations since 1947. We continue this tradition today, with Australians serving in peace and security operations across the globe. (p.16)

Since the release of the last White Paper in 2013, Australia’s contributions to UN peacekeeping have continued to decline. There are currently just over 30 ADF personnel deployed to UN operations in South Sudan and the Middle East. When you add the nearly dozen AFP personnel also serving on UN peace operations, Australia is ranked 84th out of 123 military and police contributors (as of December 2015). (p.17)

Australia announced the removal of the ban on women in combat roles in 2011, included in a suite of measures to change the culture of the Australian Defence Force recommended in the review conducted by Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick. (p.21)

Since January 2013, women currently serving as members of the Australian Defence Force have been entitled to apply for a career in a combat role, provided they meet all the requirements. Direct entry recruitment commenced from January 2016. (p.21)

In the wake of a number of publicised sex scandals, the Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick led an independent review of the treatment of women at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), followed by a separate review into improving employment opportunities for women in Defence more broadly, especially in the higher ranks. In 2012, Defence said it committed to the recommendations made and set some participation targets. The Navy and Air Force each sit at 18% female participation, but their goals are 25% by 2023. While the Army is currently at 11.9% female participation, with the aim of 15% by 2023. (p.22)

Depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress and other mental health disorders are common among the war veteran community. (p.23)

In March 2016, a Senate inquiry into the mental health of Australian Defence Force members and veterans found nearly one in four returned soldiers had experienced a mental disorder in the previous 12 months; the rate of suicidality was double that of the general population. The Senate committee’s report also noted the estimated prevalence of lifetime trauma exposure in the ADF from serving as a peacekeeper was 31.5%. Since 2000, 108 ADF members were suspected or had been confirmed to have died as a result of suicide. (p.25)

The 2016 Defence White Paper maps a course towards a total of $195 billion in defence capability or equipment by 2020-21, together with a larger military force of 62,400 personnel, the largest in a quarter of a century. (p.26)

The 2016 Defence White Paper explains how the Government is investing in Australia’s defence capabilities to strengthen Australia’s security in the more complex strategic environment Australia will face in the years ahead. (p.30)

The 2016 Defence White Paper says the roles of the US and China and their relationship will continue to be the most strategically important factors in the Indo-Pacific region to 2035. (p.35)

Six key drivers will shape Australia’s security environment in the next two decades, the 2016 Defence White Paper says. These are: the role of the US and China and their relationship; challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order; the enduring threat of terrorism; state fragility within our immediate neighbourhood; the pace of military modernisation and the development of more capable military forces; and the emergence of new complex, non-geographical threats, including cyber threats. (p.36)

The US rebalance to Asia and China’s recent policies in the South China Sea are intensifying strategic competition between the two countries; it’s also increasingly straining the Australia-China security relationship. (p.46)
GLOSSARY

**Alliance**
A close relationship between nations that is formed to advance common interests or causes.

**ANZUS Treaty**
The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) is the 1951 collective security agreement binding Australia and New Zealand and, separately, Australia and the United States, to co-operate on military matters in the Pacific Ocean region, although today the treaty is taken to relate to conflicts worldwide. It provides that an armed attack on any of the three parties would be dangerous to the others, and that each should act to meet the common threat.

**Australian Defence Force**
The Australian Defence Force consists of the Australian Navy, Army and Air Force. The mission of the ADF is to protect Australia and its natural interests.

**Capability**
The combination of military equipment, personnel, logistics support, training, resources, etc that provides Defence with the ability to achieve its operational aims.

**Defence**
Resistance against danger, attack, or harm; protection.

**Defence posture**
The Australian Government aims to reshape Defence’s posture to ensure Defence is best positioned to protect Australia’s security and prosperity by being more active and internationally engaged. This includes strengthening Defence’s international engagement and international defence relationships and arrangements, enhancing the ADF’s preparedness and investing in upgrades to the ADF’s basing and infrastructure.

**Defence strategy**
The Australian Government’s latest defence strategy (2016) sets out three strategic defence interests which are of fundamental significance for strategic defence planning. The most basic strategic defence interest is a secure, resilient Australia. The second objective is to support the security of maritime South-East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security. The third strategic defence interest is in a stable Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order which supports our interests.

**Defence White Paper**
The 2016 Defence White Paper is published by the Australian Department of Defence and outlines a strategic plan for the Australian Defence Force over the next decade. The paper describes the need for improvement in ADF capabilities, and includes a commitment to A$195 billion in spending on new equipment and resources, as well as plans for restructure and review of the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force and the Australian Army.

**Joint exercise**
An exercise involving two or more services of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

**Military**
Of, for, or pertaining to the army or armed forces, often as distinguished from the navy.

**Peacebuilding**
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacity at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding uses a variety of strategies, processes and activities (including peacekeeping) to sustain peace over the long-term by reducing the risk of relapse into violent conflict.

**Protection**
The process of keeping someone or something safe, or the condition of being kept safe.

**Readiness**
The readiness of defence forces to be committed to operations within a specified time, dependent on the availability and proficiency of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables.

**Reserves**
Consists of the Naval Reserve, the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve.

**Safety**
Safety is the freedom from the occurrence or risk of injury, danger, or loss.

**Security**
Connected with safety and protection.

**Surveillance**
The close observation of people or groups who are under suspicion or who are participating in war.
WEB LINKS

Websites with further information on the topic

At Ease (Department of Veterans’ Affairs)  www.at-ease.dva.gov.au
Australian Institute of International Affairs  www.internationalaffairs.org.au
Australian Strategic Policy Institute  www.aspi.org.au
Australians at War (Australian War Memorial)  www.awm.gov.au/atwar
Department of Defence  www.defence.gov.au
Department of Defence Ministers  www.minister.defence.gov.au
Department of Veterans’ Affairs  www.dva.gov.au
Institute for Regional Security  www.regionalsecurity.org.au
Lowy Institute for International Policy  www.lowyinstitute.org

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